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ABSTRACT
The Earl of Dartmouth was a gentle, good, amiable 
man* Like all Englishmen of his day he was a Whig in that 
he was a firm believer in Parliamentary supremacy! unlike 
some, he saw no danger in this supremacy for the liberties 
of America. He entered government because his stepbrother 
needed support, and while he had some sound ideas on 
colonial policy, he could not overcome the obstacles he 
faced in putting them into effect. His ideas were out of 
tune with those of the king and a majority of the cabinet, 
and he lacked the political talent to make them prevail.
His office was not set up to give him full control over 
American affairs or even to give him full and accurate in­
format ion.
The Boston Tea Party horrified him as it did those in 
opposition who had made their politics a war on Lord north’s 
American policy. Before the tea party he had hoped to end 
dissension between mother country and colonies by letting 
contention subside and by separating the power of taxation 
from the exercise of it? if the colonists would forbear 
denying the former, Parliament would refrain from maintain­
ing it by the latter. After the tea party he believed that 
the colonists must be made to obey the laws of Parliament 
or suffered to become independent. He didn’t mean to con­
quer the Americans, but to create ”inconveniences” for them-- 
"Inconveniences" not unlike those the colonies had caused 
the mother country in 1765--which would bring them to a 
sense of their duties and privileges as members of the 
Empire. At the same time he hoped to quiet the unrest by 
capturing the incendiaries. He did not agree to the lengths 
his colleagues went, but he was with them in spirit if not 
in degree! while he would have prevented the Administration 
of Justice Act, The Quartering Act and parts of the Massa­
chusetts Government Act, had it been in his power, it was 
not and he was not so discomfited by them that he failed to 
steer them through the House of Lords. If America would 
once show submission to its laws, then Parliament could 
repeal the Tea Duty and thus demonstrate that It could be 
sovereign in name and not In deed.
When it become apparent that these measures had only 
succeeded in further exciting the colonists* "jealousy of 
their liberties”, Dartmouth hoped to restore the empire’s 
harmony by reminding its subjects that Britain’s resolution
vi
to uphold its authority was tempered by benevolence, of 
which the Conciliatory Proposition was to be evidence. 
Behind the scenes he was seeking In every way he knew to 
explore the areas of agreement between the two parties.
But he saw no inconsistency in continued firmness, which, 
for practical reasons, he had to acquiesce in anyway.
When his three policies, non-aggravation, firmness 
and benevolence, had obviously failed to achieve unity, his 
belief in Parliamentary authority and love of empire com- n 
biaed to convince him that force, with the ugly consequence 
of civil war, was necessary. To make room for its execu­
tion, he resigned his Seals, but unable to desert north, 
he remained in government as Lord Privy Seal.
vli
CHAPTER I 
THE AMIABIiE BGRD DARTMOUTH
1 HA IXI HAPPY DAYr'
It is customary, la a personality-oriented essay, to 
begin with an introduction to the personality* In the case 
of William Xegge, the second Earl of Dartmouth, and an 
essay examining the crucial years leading up to Britain’s 
loss of her first Empire, this introduction is tantamount 
to putting the denouement in the first chapter. For it will 
be evident, once the reader becomes acquainted with the 
Earl, and certainly once he places him in his eighteenth- 
century milieu, that Dartmouth was simply not constituted 
to serve as saviour of the Empire, if indeed, any one 
statesman could have saved it*
But this was not apparent when Dartmouth became Secre­
tary of State for the Colonies in 1772, either to him, his 
English admirers, or the American subjects so unhappy with 
their imperial connection* Dartmouth had warm feelings for 
his "fellow subjects . . . who, notwithstanding their late 
excesses, * . . possessed * . , sound and sober principles
n
of both religion and government." He entertained high
2
hopes for a peaceful settlement of the difficulties and so
2
3did the many friends who wrote to compliment him on his
3appointment. The King welcomed him to the Cabinet with 
unusual ardor. It augured well to have "so great and good 
a man as lord Dartmouth’1^  take what had come to be a crucial 
place in the administration.
the news had its most enthusiastic reception in 
America. There Dartmouth's accession was greeted with uni* 
versal ley and thanksgiving. From Boston, former slave 
Phillis Wheatly summed up the prevailing mood in a congratu­
latory poem that began;
Hail! Happy Bay! when smiling like the morn 
Fair Freedom rose, Hew England to Adorn.6
Isaac Skillman, a Boston preacher, dedicated An Oration Upon
the Beauties of liberty, or the Essential Bights of
*7 A
Americans f to Dartmouth* Benjamin Franklin, in London as
agent for several colonies, put aside a pamphlet he had
written on the dispute between Britain and America due to
”an expectation . . . from the good character of the noble
lord (Dartmouth), that the grievances of the colonies would
be . . . redressed," and wrote home of the "favourable
appearances arising from the change of our American minis -
t e r . A n o t h e r  letter of Franklin's, this one anonymous,
appeared in the Fublick Advertiser;
But tho the Americans have been long 
oppressed, let them not despair. The 
administration of the colonies is no 
longer in the hands of a Shelburne, a 
Glare, or a Hillsborough; Thank Heaven 
that department is HOW entrusted to an 
EHGLISHMAB! Be it his glory to reverse 
those baneful and pernicious measures 
which have too long harrowed the
colonies, and have given such a 
blow to the Credit, the Commerce 
and the NAVAL BOWER of the mother 
country.10
let far from effecting reconciliation, in less than 
three years Dartmouth found himself charged with waging war 
on his "fellow subjects". In contrast to the sunburst of 
expectation in which he entered office, his exit took place 
amidst storm clouds of failure.
The purpose here is to resolve this paradox. In
searching for clues to such resolution we will study Dart*)
mouth himself, his office, the political situation of his 
day, and the years he served as American Secretary.
'ONE WHO WEARS A CORONET AND PRAXS*
The second Earl of Dartmouth was born William Legge
on June 20, 1T31, with all the privileges and expectations
of a member of the upper class. His family was not wealthy
but their son inherited a sizable estate with houses at
St. James Square in London, Blackheath in Kenty Woodsome
in Xorkshire, and what was to be his favorite residence,
Sandwe11 in Staffordshire. His father died when young
William was a little over a year old, so at his grandfather'
death in 1?50, Dartmouth came directly into his title and 
11estate. When William was five his mother became the 
second wife of Francis, the seventh baron North who after­
wards became the first Earl of Guilford* This marriage 
proved to be as great an influence on the course of his 
future life as his own birth for it united him with Guil­
ford's family and after his mother's death, with that i
of his stepmother, Guilford’s third wife. Guilford’s sod,
Frederick, was two years older than Dartmouth and the two
became devoted friends, growing up in the same household,
attending Oxford and taking the fashionable tour of the con*
11
tinent together.
The family circle was large and intimate, Dartmouth
had two older sisters and a half brother and sister from his
mother’s second marriage as well as his stepbrother Frederick*
Guilford was a doting parent to each without distinction,
and the brothers and sisters Ignored their half and step
12relationships as well.
Jonathan Swift had written of the first Earl that "my 
Lord Dartmouth is a man of letters, full of good sense and 
good nature, and honor) of strict virtue and regularity in 
his life but labours under one great defect--that is he treats 
his clerks with more civility and good manners than others 
in his station have done the Q u e e n .  The words could have
been applied equally to his grandson. He was generally 
known as "the good Lord Dartmouth" and Richardson let it be 
known soon after the appearance of his novel depicting the 
good man, Sir Charles Grandlson, that the young earl might 
have been the model for his bero.lif A moral and upright 
character was not his only virtue. As often as he is called 
good he is termed "amiable. 4 young Peggy Hutchinson 
wrote enthusiastically to her sis ter*in-law soon after her 
arrival in London in ITT**-* "He is the most amiable man I 
ever saw) and was he not married, and was he not a Lord, I
/him . ,
**^ d he teatpted + dowred kinswomen of
o ®.e/
12 ^^55 Da**.* Catherine Nicholl. An old
hls st ur
ePmoihe*^ new lady Dartmouth as "rather
F&mtly - . /
-1 ^ lena civil" and, perhaps most significant-
P r e ■£ >/ j. _
* • * e is . * ." The marriage was long and
ly f*as *. /
®°<&hared an interest in religion and their
baPPy as
yen. The Historical Mannscripts Commission*®
®ine ej
A  of his papers provides ample illustration of Dart-
««le/
concern for his immediate and larger families, 
lasting many long letters dealing with such problems as his
9ons* education and his sister's marriage settlement.
/
Managing these affairs and overseeing his estates were a
large part of the private life he loved.
There were other activities of a personal nature that
kept Dartmouth busy in his private life, however* His
stepmother introduced him not only to his wife but to the
Countess of Huntingdon, around whom an evangelical group 
18
had grown up. Not really dissenters, they were seeking 
to reform the Anglican church from within, with emphasis on 
personal and "methodical" piety. Dartmouth was well ac­
quainted with and well regarded by many of the Methodist 
leaders, and at one time was considered as the logical 
successor to Lady Huntingdon as leader of the circle. His 
admiration for the serious godliness of the Puritans was one 
of the strongest bonds of sympathy he felt for America. So
7universally known was the Bari’s religiosity, that in an 
era of widespread latltudinarianism, characterized by vice 
and evil on all layers of society,^ his ’goodness1 was 
often ridiculed. Horace Walpole once described him as "in 
the odour of devotion"and lord Hillsborough found him
21
unfit for office due to a surfeit of humanity and religion.
If some sneered# one of Dartmouth's greatest admirers on
this account, was the King* George Ill’s religious ideas
were not too different from Dartmouth’s and he thought him
op
"a most excellent man." Quite a few of his letters bear
testimony to the esteem in which he held the Earl2^  but
none is so poignant as the one he sent him when Worth’s
ministry fell,
To avow how very near he (Dartmouth) will 
ever be to my heart, and that I have ever 
esteemed him in another light than any of 
his companions . . ♦ What days it has pleased 
the Almighty to place me in when Lord 
Dartmouth can be a man to be removed but at 
his own request I But I cannot complain, X 
adore the will of Providence, and will ever 
resign obediently to His Will. My heart is 
too full to add more. ^
It followed naturally for a man of Dartmouth’s beat to
have charitable and benevolent interests. Some of these
were of a religious sort? for example, his support of
John Hewton# a slaver who became a parson, and the Eleazar
Wheelock Indian Charity School, an American institution
designed to train Indian boys to preach the gospel to their
own people# The latter benefitted so much from his time and
25
money that it was named Dartmouth College in his honor.
6should be tempted to set my cap at him . , ,nJ‘
In 1755 Dartmouth married a well dowred kinswoman of
his stepmother. Miss Frances Catherine Wlcholl. An old
family friend described the new Lady Dartmouth as "rather
pretty . . . cheerful, civil" and, perhaps most significant-
17ly, "as good as be is . * The marriage was long and
happy as they shared an interest in religion and their 
nine children, fhe Historical Manuscripts Commission1® 
calendar of his papers provides ample illustration of Dart­
mouth's concern for his immediate and larger families, 
listing many long letters dealing with such problems as his 
sons* education and his sister's marriage settlement*
Managing these affairs and overseeing his estates were a 
large part of the private life he loved.
Hhere were other activities of a personal nature that 
kept Dartmouth busy in his private life, however. His 
stepmother introduced him not only to his wife but to the
Countess of Huntingdon, around whom an evangelical group 
18
had grown up. Hot really dissenters, they were seeking 
to reform the Anglican church from within, with emphasis on 
personal and "methodical" piety. Dartmouth was well ac­
quainted with and well regarded by many of the Methodist 
leaders, and at one time was considered as the logical 
successor to Lady Huntingdon as leader of the circle. His 
admiration for the serious godliness of the Puritans was one 
of the strongest bonds of sympathy he felt for America. So
7universally known was the Bari's religiosity, that in an 
era of widespread latitudinarianism, characterized by vice 
and evil on all layers of s o c i e t y , ^  his 'goodness1 was 
often ridiculed* Horace Walpole once described him as "in 
the odour of devotion" ^  and lord Hillsborough found him
21
unfit for office due to a surfeit of humanity and religion.
If some sneered# one of Dartmouth's greatest admirers on
this account, was the King* George Ill's religious ideas
were not too different from Dartmouth's and he thought him
22"a most excellent man." Quite a few of his letters hear
testimony to the esteem in which he held the Barl^, fcUt
none is so poignant as the one he sent him when Worth's
ministry fell,
Ho avow how very near he (Dartmouth) will 
ever he to my heart, and that I have ever 
esteemed him in another light than any of 
his companions . . * What days it has pleased
the Almighty to place me in when lord 
Dartmouth can he a man to he removed hut at 
his own request! But I cannot complain, I 
adore the will of Providence, and will ever 
resign obediently to His Will. My heart is 
too full to add more.
It followed naturally for a man of Dartmouth's heat to
have charitable and benevolent interests. Some of these
were of a religious sort: for example, his support of
John Hewton, a slaver who became a parson, and the BXeaaar 
Wbeelock Indian Charity School, an American institution 
designed to train Indian boys to preach the gospel to their
own people. £he latter benefitted so much from his time and
25
money that it was named Dartmouth College in his honor.
8Other philanthropies were cultural and artistic. The
poet William Cowper and poet-essayist Dr* James Beattie
received financial aid as well as sympathy from Dartmouth
and the Bari sought to encourage a variety of artists by
26buying or commissioning their work. It was Cowper who 
celebrated Dartmouth in his poem ’Truth" as "one who wears 
a coronet and prays." His patron's concern for the poet's 
well-being is seen in a score of letters in volume III of 
the Historical Manuscripts Commission calendar of the 
Dartmouth papers.
Thus his attachment to domestic life, religion, letters 
and philanthropy combined to keep him from assuming any 
public role. He had taken his seat in the House of Lords 
on May 31* 175 ,^ upon his return from the continent; but 
while he had spoken with the Newcastle Whigs on the Cider 
Tax in 17^3 and in denouncing the pamphlet Droit le Bol in 
176h, these were the only two times he had raised his voice 
on an issue in ten years# He was not interested in 
politics.
A GENTLE MAN ENTERS GENTLEMAN’S POLITICS
Dartmouth was not interested in politics and he had 
little aptitude for its combative atmosphere. Possessed of 
the integrity of a statesman, he lacked the shrewdness of 
a Newcastle or the pugnacity of a Pitt. In 1766 when it was 
being considered whether his office would become a third
9Secretary of State or continue as First Lord of Trade, his 
friend the Earl of Chesterfield wrote him to "lay aside 
upon this occasion your natural timidity and diffidence! 
spur on your friends who wish you extremely well,1 The 
failure of Dartmouth to achieve the third secretaryship at
oR
this time had as much to do with Pitt*s disapprobation 
as Dartmouth’s diffidence, but it is indicative of his na­
ture that Chesterfield should write to him in such a vein* 
In spite of the fact that Dartmouth had spent the 
first years of his adult life engrossed in private matters, 
he must have known that his background and station could 
not allow him to avoid the responsibility of public busi­
ness forever* His grandfather had played an active role 
on the political stage, serving in the House of Lords, on 
the Board of Trade, as Secretary of State for the Southern 
Department and as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal until the 
death of Queen Anne * Two of his uncles, Heneage Legge and
Henry Bilson Legge, had served as Baron and Chancellor of
29
the Exchequer, respectively. It was the former who wrote
to him during his grand tour:
Hobody wishes your success and good figure 
in the world more warmly than I do . * .
(Ju-Q 1 can’t help crying ‘Fire!1 when I 
see any danger coming toward you* There is 
a huge dose of flattery preparing for you 
in high places, against your return to 
England * , * . We have an excellent hand 
at it in this country and if a young man of 
Quality and fortune can count twenty when 
he returns and does not absolutely pick 
pockets, we all cry, ’Tertius caelo cecidit 
Cato!* But I thank God youhavesense 
and spirit enough to take the substantial 
benefit of a good character and not let the
10
flattery which will attend it turn you 
[and North] into asses. 30
The young Earl apparently took this advice to heart. From
his other uncle he acquired the political principles that
led him to align himself with the old Whigs centered around
the Duke of Newcastle in the House of Lords. It was the
Duke who at length convinced Dartmouth to hear the call of
duty, forsake his own inclinations, and join the Rockingham
Ministry. The call from Newcastle must have been persuasive,
for he was a cousin to North and his wife was a cousin of
Dartmouth's. Together the step brothers had visited him during
their tour while he was in attendance to George II in
Hanover.^ In the decade that had elapsed since that intimacy,
he had performed several favors of patronage for Dartmouth,
and the two had corresponded at length concerning the
last illness of Dartmouth's uncle, Henry Bilson Legge,
who was a friend of Newcastle's.^ When he heard that
Dartmough had refused an invitation to join the new ministry
as either First Lord of Trade or in a position at the
Treasury, he wrote him that
I must do justice to us all that it was 
essential in forming an administration that 
would satisfy the nation, and be able to
carry on the business with credit and repu­
tation, to have your Lordship in such rank 
and station as should be most agreeable to 
you.
Perhaps more telling in its effect on Dartmouth than this
flattery was his contention that:
The Duke of Grafton and my Lord Rockingham 
are both about your Lordship's age, and if
11
they had not got the hotter of their 
own inclination for the sake of the 
King, and the Public* I don * t know where 
the King would have got a Secretary of 
State* or a freasury.3^
Dartmouth could no longer refuse and in July he Joined
Rockingham as head of the Board of Trade.
Eis entrance into active politics separated him from 
Horih* who* after taking a seat in Commons in 1?5^ and being 
appointed a Junior lord of the Treasury in IT59> had been 
cooperating with the Grenville administration* Moreover* 
in his only two speeches in Parliament Dartmouth had 
taken an opposite stand from his stepbrother.^ neverthe­
less* there does not seem to have been any alienation 
between them* for Hewcastle wrote Dartmouth in the fall in 
reference "to sound (i^sD OXLT friend* my lord Worth*"
on an "honorable and advantageous offer*1’ apparently in an 
attempt to get him to come over to the Whigs.3^ Dartmouth 
was unable to obtain an affirmative reply* and it was not 
many years before the making of offers was reversed and 
Worth was attempting to persuade Dartmouth to accept an
ri4*Tnm n t  p O  111 Oluw II v «
If Dartmouth was reluctant to enter the political 
arena* once there* as was fitting for a man of his cons­
cience* he took his new duties seriously. He lacked experi­
ence and sometimes enjoyed only a tenuous relationship to 
the rest of the ministry*^ but these drawbacks did not 
hinder his zeal. He came into government in the midst of
the Stamp Act crisis and that affair demanded immediate 
attention. Rockingham's group had accepted the King's 
invitation to take office even though they had no solution 
for the conflict, and were undecided on what to do about 
it for some months. On the one hand was the appeal of 
overturning an act of the Grenville Whigs, hut on the other 
the hesitation to set a precedent that might impair the
power of Parliament. As Bargar points out, no true Whig
38could he expected to support an unconditional repeal, 
which would impeach Parliamentary Supremacy. The ministry 
hedged until after Pitt had declared himself and the path 
of practical politics became clear.
Dartmouth never questioned Parliamentary supremacy, 
but he earnestly believed that this particular tax was 
inexpedient^ and should therefore be abolished. The non­
importation agreements had created hardships in England and 
the First lord of Trade declared in the House of Lords 
that "not less than 50,000 men in this kingdom were at this 
time ripe for rebellion for want of work, from the uneasy 
situation in the colonies."^0 The solution to this quandary 
of Parliamentary Integrity and colonial intransigenee lay 
in repeal coupled with the Declaratory Act stating unequi­
vocally Parliament's right to legislate for the colonies in 
all cases whatsoever. The strength of Dartmouth's belief 
in the correctness of this course is revealed in a letter 
to Rockingham urging him not to resign on its account:
13
The case is not yet desperate and while 
there is the least shadow of hope of 
doing good, I would on no account give 
up the game to those who will, undoubtedly, 
do mischief. The Act once repealed, I 
shall heartily congratulate your Lordship 
upon a release from your fatigue. Your 
successors may then he left to enjoy the 
sweets of an honorable coalition and hug 
themselves in possession of employment, 
which nothing but concern for the public 
good can make it worth your while to 
hold
Speaking for the bills in Lords, and securing proxies from 
Huntingdon and Chesterfield, he helped secure the passage 
he felt so vital.
BockIngham’s ministry fell in the summer of 1766 and 
with Pitt’s refusal to allow a change in the handling 
of American affairs, Dartmouth went into retirement.
While he was doubtless pleased to give greater attention 
to his religious and philanthropic interests, he continued 
his association with the Rockingham group** 3 and the several 
pamphlets and papers relating to American problems that 
remain in his papers bear witness to his continuing interest 
in American affairs.****
At the end of 176? Horth Joined Crafton’s Ministry as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and it was natural that Dartmouth 
should have become less ardent in opposition once his step­
brother was a member of the administration. His passivity 
is apparent in his reply to Bockingham’s desire for him to 
attend a Lords’ debate on resolutions regarding the Townshend 
Acts x
My zeal for the welfare and prosperity of 
the Americans and in them of this country, 
the indignation X feel against those, who 
upon partial and unfair representations of 
a prejudiced and heated Governor, would drive 
them to despair and above all, the value I 
set upon your Lordship’s friendship inclines me 
to wish myself now in consultation with you 
upon the proper means to resist the resolu­
tions . . .  At the same time, the shortness 
of the time to prepare myself for such an 
event, together with the distance I am at * . 
the snow that is in the air and will fall 
before tomorrow morning, and a variety of 
family reasons constrain me to lament that 
administration will bring on their measures at 
a time when they are not only sure of carry­
ing them (which I am afraid they would do 
at any time), but when many of those who do 
not probably entertain exactly the saae ideas 
with themselves are not in the way to declare 
their disapprobation. My comfort Is that it 
will be resolutely done by those who are 
present and that my absence will be of no 
more consequence than the loss of one in­
effectual voice from the member of the 
diesidents. ^
Later he fell out with the Rockinghamites over their policy 
concerning the radical John Wilkes, and the way was pre­
pared for his eventual political union with North.
Dartmouth’s love for and intimacy with North had not 
ceased during the years they had belonged to separate po­
litical groups. In a teasing tone bespeaking both he wrote 
to his stepfather in 1766, "Pray tell that perfidious swain 
Lord North that we are not at all obliged to him for the 
concise and peremptory note he sent us the other day, in- 
stead of bringing himself and Lady North to see us.
His admiration of North’s performance In office increased
liT
at the same time his affection remained constant*
In 1771 the ministry entered a crisis over the question 
of war with Spain* Lord Weymouth, who favored war against 
Lord Worth's opposition to it, resigned his Seals as Secre­
tary of State. In attempts to strengthen his position in
the cabinet Worth offered this post first to Hardwicke^®
and, on his refusal to Lord Dartmouth* The latter declined
as well for reasons which Worth said he could not do justice
1^ 9
to in a letter^ apparently it was his personal preference 
for private life that made him disappoint his stepbrother.^ 
But while Worth understood Dartmouth’s reasons, his step­
father did not* In an anguished letter that must have 
brought a like anguish to its reader, Guilford told him:
The more I reflect upon your refusal yes­
terday, the more I am vexed. To have 
you appear to the world wanting in duty
and regard to the King, love to your
country, friendship to Lord Worth, and 
affection to me, is what I thought I should 
never live to see. I am too much hurt to 
talk upon the subject.^1-
This breach in an otherwise devoted family healed quickly;
its significance lies in the pressure that memory of it
would bring to bear on the lari not to refuse Worth's second
bid to the Cabinet*
That came in August of 1772. In order to make Worth's
need for Dartmouth's presence in the administration clear,
Bargar^2 details the Prime Minister’s difficulties with its
other members. Worth had joined the ministry in 17&7, and
16
took the leadership In 17T0 when Grafton resigned the 
Treasury. Though he had no particular following of his 
own, nor any set of principles that distinguished him, he 
kept his place by virtue of the "Mingfs confidence in him and 
his ability at the Treasury and in Commons. As a result 
he was supported by the King’s Friends and several conser­
vatives alienated from the Opposition by the Wilkes affair. 
Grenville’s followers were weakened by his death in 1770 
and then came over to ministry when Wedderburn and Suffolk 
accepted offices in it. north’s real difficulty lay in 
his relationship with the members of the Bedford group-- 
the "Bloomsbury Gang"--who were already in government when 
he came in in 1767, They were unreliable, often hostile, 
with ill-concealed hopes that Worth’s coalition would 
falter and they would be invited to head the government 
and control the resulting patronage plums. The only real 
friend Worth had in the ministry was the Earl of Hillsborough, 
Dartmouth’s successor at the Board of Trade and now Secretary 
of State for the American Colonies. As such, he became the 
target of the Bedfords who hoped, in forcing him to resign, 
to oust Worth as well.
Hillborough*s difficulty came when he rejected plans 
for a western colony that many Influential Britons supported. 
When the Privy Council overturned his recommendation that 
the petition of the newly formed Ohio Company be dropped, 
Hillsborough chose to retire rather than put the distasteful 
project into effect* Finding himself friendless in his own
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Cabinet, North then appealed to Dartmouth to take Hillsborough1©
office, and preserve the ministry from the Bedfords. His
letter to his stepbrother graphically demonstrates the reasons
Dartmouth re-entered government employments
You can not, I think, doubt of my earnest 
•wish to have you within the services of 
the Crown, in a situation becoming your 
rank, abilities, and character, and you 
must be sensible how much I stand in need 
of your friendship and assistance upon 
the present occasion . . « Cif) you decline 
my proposition, you will certainly distress 
(jnej, if not the public service. 53
Such a request could scarcely be refused in view of Dartmouth*® 
family relationships no matter how great his aversion to 
political life, or his inclination towards personal pur­
suits. It is also clear that Dartmouth’s accession had 
nothing to do with American policy. In fact, North's first 
attempt to solve the crisis had been to offer the Seals to 
Lord Weymouth, who had refused. His offer to Dartmouth 
was made Mwithout taking any notice to the other ministers"^ 
who were doubtless disappointed by his acceptance. Hot 
only did Worth’s ministry not fall, but the American office 
itself survived,^ and its patronage failed to devolve 
upon the other two Secretaries.-^
0NE BMPIBB UNDER PARLIAMENT
Part of the general rejoicing in America that accompa­
nied Dartmouth’s appointment was due to his reputation as 
at once an amiable and a religious man. But the main
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ground for Dartmouth’s popularity in the colonies was his 
part in the repeal of the Stamp Act. At that time he had 
received many letters from the colonies, from private per­
sons, and from colonial assemblies* congratulating him and 
thanking him.-^ John Randolph even sent him a brace of 
young eagles in appreciation.*^
But in praising repeal, of the obnoxious Stamp Act, 
the colonists overlooked the Declaratory Act, and in thank­
ing Dartmouth for ridding them of the former they failed
to understand his adherence to the latter. In 1766, writ­
ing to Mr. De Berdt as he left the Board of Trade,
Dartmouth had said of the Americansj
I should always have been happy to have 
assisted fthemj in promoting every wish 
they could reasonably form consistent 
with that subjection to the supreme 
authority of the mother country, upon which 
I think their own, as well as our welfare 
and prosperity much depend; and which upon 
the present principles of the general 
constitution, they undoubtedly owe. 58
Dartmouth had, after all, taken his political principles 
from his uncle and the old Whig Hewc&stle; like them he 
could admit of no impairment to the authority of Parlia­
ment. Parliament’s claim to supremacy over the Empire 
was'‘inherent in and inseparable from the supreme authority 
of the State;” to deny it was "wild and extravagant . . 
utterly inconsistent with any pretension to a share in the 
privileges and advantages of British subjects. ” 59
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Yet with a touch of pragmatism seemingly out of charac­
ter, he ‘believed that Parliamentary supremacy, while it 
could not be denied, should not be argued about with the 
colonists. Perhaps he took his cue from an undated paper
^ A
Of suggestions for America in his manuscripts. It recommended 
that the Declaratory Act remain unrepealed, without saying 
a word about it in subsequent negotiations. The unlimited 
supremacy of Parliament was not to be claimed on one side 
or questioned on the other. Then the aggrieving acts passed 
since 1T63 could be undone. Expressing this idea to Cushing 
he said, '*If my wishes and sentiments could have any 
weight with a British Parliament, the exercise of fits 
rightsj . . . should be suspended and lie dormant till 
some occasion should arise . . .  in which the expediency 
and necessity of such exercise should be obvious . . . ."59
The altercation Governor Hutchinson got into with 
the Assembly of Massachusetts Bay in 1773 was exactly what 
Dartmouth did not wish to happen. Hutchinson initiated 
the dispute by opening the session with an address claiming 
that the colony was either totally subject to Parliament 
or completely independent; the Assembly predictably re­
plied that Parliament had no authority to bind them what­
soever and further petitioned for Hutchinson’s removal.
The ministry was, as Franklin so aptly put it, "Chagrined 
with his officiousness, their intention having been to let 
all contention subside, and by degrees suffer matters to
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return to the old channel.” Dartmouth wrote Hutchinson 
that it was "vain to hope that the Council and House of 
Representatives can he induced to yield due obedience to
the laws of Parliament,” and urged him to avoid further
 ^o
discussion. But the damage had been done and Dartmouth's 
attempts to mend it are illustrative not only of his rather 
naive approach but of the essential unmendability of the 
difficulties *
First he tried to avoid laying the dispatches about 
the affair before Parliament, knowing that it would feel 
called upon to take some action to defend its sovereignty 
which would only make the situation worse. Since accounts 
had already appeared in the newspapers this tactic was 
hopeless. Then he tried to get Franklin to convince the 
assembly to withdraw their Declaration. "I wish they 
could be persuaded to reconsider the matter, and do it of 
themselves, voluntarily, and thus leave things between us 
on the old footing, the points undiscussed," he told the 
agent in anrinterview. But Franklin replied, "If they 
were even to wish matters back in the situation before the 
governor’s speech, and the dispute obliterated, they 
cannot withdraw their answer till he first withdraws his 
speech, which methinks would be an awkward operation that 
perhaps he will hardly be directed to perform." Franklin 
then suggested that it would be prudent of Parliament to 
allow the dispatches to lie on the table and take no
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further notice of them; it was, after all, quibbling over
"an authority they can never well exercise for want of
due information and knowledge, and therefore it is not
worth hazarding the mischief to preserve it." Obviously
6 ^Dartmouth could not agree, and the conversation J closed 
with his Lordship still urging Franklin to get the 
Assembly to withdraw their petition*
But what Dartmouth would have had both parties to the 
dispute ignore, was the one thing that was inevitably 
driving them apart: their differing interpretations of the 
constitution. As time wore on the colonists added to 
their denial of Parliamentary supervision an elevation of 
the King that could only horrify an English Whig and even 
the King himself. King-in-Parliament^in eighteenth-century 
Britain, was omnicompetent, and no derogation of this 
competence, or of the legislative dominance of the Monarch, 
could be suffered.
So the Americans* faith in Dartmouth as their advocate 
in the administration was somewhat misplaced. Because of 
his association with the Bockingham Whigs and his role in 
repealing the Stamp Act, they had assumed he was all on
fi ittheir side. But this was not the only source of their 
error. They were not mistaken in their assessment of the 
American Secretary as one "disposed to concede every claim 
of the colonies which can consist with their continuing 
united to the K i n g d o m . H e  was, as Thomas Hutchinson
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described him^as amiable a man as you know--a man of 
literature as well as good natural s e n s e , F r a n k l i n  had 
been treated rudely by Hillsborough, who had even balked at 
recognizing him as a legitimate agent from Massachusetts 
Bay: by contrast the new Secretary was most pleasant. After 
a conversation with Dartmouth on one occasion Franklin 
remarked on the "complaisance in his contenance. Indeed
Dartmouth was courteous at all timesj he never said any­
thing unfavorable unless he had preceded it with some friend­
ly remark. In chastising Hutchinson on his dispute with 
the Assembly, Dartmouth acknowledged first that he had meant 
well, Later, in relating his denial of the proposition 
that taxation without representation was the equivalent of 
slavery in a letter he was discussing with John Vardill, 
he remarked first that he approved of its "good sense and 
some of the opinions.”^7 His kindness was more than mere 
diplomacy] it sprang from a real tenderness towards America 
and a genuine hope for the end of contention.
Yet while diplomacy is of real value in politics when 
it is insincere, Dartmouth's sincerity blinded him to the 
crude realities of the situation and severely limited his 
action. As Hutchinson lamented, ’’His greatest foible is 
an excess of humanity, which makes him apt sometimes to 
think more favorably of some men than they deserve."^5 
Franklin came to understand this as he complained that "he 
is truly a good man, and wishes sincerely a good understand­
ing with the colonies, but does not seem to have the
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68strength equal to his wishes." Arthur Lee was bitter:
The professions of Lord Dartmouth I 
own give me very little confidence; he 
was called upon last session of Parlia­
ment by our unalterable friend Lord 
Shelburne to account for his having 
done nothing to conciliate the colonies; 
he answered with fair promises; he will 
again be called on by this same noble 
Lord. I think he must then speak de­
cisively, as any further evasion will 
be palpable*^9
Such inability, in the light of future events, was 
indeed palpable. Aside from the nature of his own per­
sonality, there were other obstacles Dartmouth faced as 
he tried to reunite the mother country and her offspring. 
Astute as ever Franklin guessed this when he wrote in 
177k, "His Lordship expressed as usual.;much concern at the 
differences subsisting, and wished they would be accomo­
dated. Perhaps good wishes are all that are in his 
power. A closer look at these obstacles should de­
monstrate that the making of "fair promises" was the best 
Dartmouth could hope to do.
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CHAPTER II
IMPEDIMENTS: THE POLITICAL BACKDROP
GOVERNMENT BY PACTION AND PATRONAGE
The political scene at the time of the American Revo­
lution has been convincingly recreated by many recent 
authors; their revisions need only a brief description here 
in order to create an appropriate setting for Lord Dart­
mouth .
Eighteenth-century England was an age marked by vivid 
and sometimes irreconcilable contrasts.1 The elegance of 
Gainsborough shared a berth in history with the earthiness 
of Hogarth; a kingdom deeply attached to a philosophy of 
rule of law tr&s peopled with subjects who freely indulged 
in the bloodiest of riots. In retrospect, perhaps no con­
trast has done historians such a disservice as that between 
the political treatises and the political actualities of 
the 1760’s and 1770’s. That this contrast is now apprecia­
ted is due to the work of many scholars, most notably 
Lewis B . Namier.
As Namier pointed out, although this was a period 
which could have divided thoughtful men on many significant 
constitutional and theoretical questions, it was essentially
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an issueless era. In spite of* the great decisions facing 
Britain as a nation and an empire, political lines were 
drawn less upon principle than upon personality and place.
The motivations for holding public office were more often 
income and position than the desire to effect a given point 
of view. But saying this is not to condemn the men of 
whom we are about to speak for lack of integrity. As 
Richard fares comments, "Our moral superiority is secured 
by many profess ions." la the eighteenth century public 
life was simply the only acceptable way for a gentleman to 
earn a living and the pursuit of personal interest in the 
service of the state was not only permitted but encouraged. 
There was nothing stinking about a sinecure or a plea for 
an inherited office; these were necessary economic facts of 
life for the upper classes much as life insurance or stock 
portfolios are in twentieth-century America. The purchase 
of a parliamentary seat caused no raised eyebrows; it was 
a proper way of providing for your sister’s son.
Under these circumstances, to belong to a party out 
of office, without the prerogatives of patronage and influ­
ence attendant with power, was an unfortunate circumstance
indeed. The only recourse was to go into opposition and,
3in Namier's words, "trump up grave dangers",, in order to 
bring down the ministry then in office and thereby improve
Tunwxn etoiUi
one’s own position, not simply politically, but economically. 
Herein is the genesis of what has appeared to our eyes,
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clouded as they are by the political habits of our own time, 
as a genuine party system. Only as we have come to under­
stand the political and economic realities of the eighteenth 
century have we been able to place the words and the deeds 
of its actors on the proper stage.
Politics was personal and local. Political ideals 
assumed real importance only as they might affect personal 
interest. For example, the group around Newcastle, while 
they were Court Whigs at heart, were forced into opposition 
in the early 1760*s for fear of impotence when Bute controlled 
access to George III. Horace Walpole gives a typical illus­
tration of the workings of Georgian politics with this 
cryptic asides
The Court, about this time, made another 
conquest, which it seemed little worth 
their while to buy so dear, unless from 
the intrinsic satisfaction of corrupting 
a fair character. Cornwall quitted the 
Opposition for a pension of 500 pounds a 
year for life.
If there were no political parties in our sense of the 
word there were political factions. But the terms Whig and 
Tory, so familiar to textbook readers on the American 
Revolution, are almost idle distinctions in the task of 
understanding these factions and the competition amongst 
them. North and others in office in the 17701® referred 
to themselves as Whigs; the Rockinghamttes were Whigs also 
but prefixed their party title with the adjectives "true”
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"high" "old” "grand" and "constitutional"; the Chatham!tes
were "independent" Whigs. Old Tories split up and followed
all three groups, and Toryism, something of a pejorative
in the late eighteenth century, became more concerned with
local issues.^
To stay in office meant controlling as many places as
possible and insuring favorable occupancy of them. Much
of a ministers time was necessarily given up to this task
as indicated by this letter from Lord North to his political
stage-manager, John Robinson:
Mr. Legge can afford only 400 pounds.
If he comes in for Lostwithiel he will 
cost the public two thousand guineas.
Gascoign should have the refusal of 
Tregony if he will pay one thousand 
pounds, but I do not see why we should 
bring him in cheaper than any other 
servant of the Crown. If he will not 
pay he must give way to Mr. Best or Mr.
Peachy . . . .  As the Duke of Newcastle 
has come into our proposal we must 
strain every nerve for his service.
Write my name to Mr. Luttrell to re­
commend Mr. Pownall. ^
Money, connections and influence skillfully manipulated kept 
a majority in Parliament and a government in power. To 
say that the political process was completely without poli­
cies or principles would of course be an exaggeration, but 
as a matter of emphasis, opinions were less important than 
position and place.
Naturally, debate on the American question was affected 
by such a political system. Richard Pares points out,
3 k
"only the Grenvilles could claim that their attitude was
determined by a consideration of policy . . . Even the
Rockinghamites hadn’t been clear on the Stamp Act .
but once the colours were nailed to the mast, there was no
7taking them down.' The Boekinghams, in spite of their 
clear identification with the American cause, still had the 
goal of office uppermost in their minds . To this end they 
pushed Pitt, who spoke strongly for the colonists, out of 
their coalition and.took in the Bedfords who were anti-
Q
American. The American problems were often regarded sim-
Q
ply as weapons to use against political enemies. Such 
political opportunism on the part of their English adher­
ents confused and revolted the Americans as seen in this 
angry letter from William Lee, an American merchant in 
business in London, to his brother in Virginia:
Lord Shelburne I always thought as wicked 
a man in politics as any in the nation 
(Lord Mansfield not excepted) and now I 
am perfectly convinced of it, as we know 
for a certainty we owe the Boston Fort 
Bill meeting with no opposition in the 
House of Commons to his concurrence with 
Lord Worth in the measure, for which he 
was to be paid with the Lieutenancy for 
Ireland and Barre was to be his Secretary.
I am rejoiced that Worth had cheated him 
for after the dirty work was done, they 
would not give him the bribe. He is a 
complete Jesuit and thereby has ever de­
ceived our Brother Templar [Arthur Lee) 
whom I cannot convince that he is a 
villain, though he cheated us in a bare­
faced manner about our first petition to 
the House of Lords against the Boston Port 
Bill. 10
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Dartmouth, was no opportunist and was possessed of considera­
bly more principle than most of his peers, hut his entry 
into office was not influenced by his hopes for conciliating 
the Americans. It was simply his duty to help his step­
brother maintain his hold on his ministry.
The constitutional, as well as the political habits of 
Great Britain, influenced the outcome of her difficulties 
with her colonies. The key figure in the political scene 
was still the King, or perhaps it should be said, was again 
the King, for part of George III* s difficulty lay in 
the fact that he sought to reassert kingly leadership at 
a time when Parliamentary leaders had taken the direction 
of government upon themselves. Newcastle had governed George 
II but George III governed Lord North.11 The King retained 
the power of appointing his ministers,' but his legislature 
could overturn them. Formerly ministers had used the 
majorities in both houses as a weapon for forcing their 
own policies upon the King, but George III countered by 
dismissing them before their position was consolidated.^
George had his own ideas about what policy should be 
followed and, being a conscientious man himself, he ex­
pected all men of good will as their duty, first to accept 
office and then and only then, to consider p o l i c y . ^  so, 
while, as illustrated above, parties existed to gain 
office rather than to chart a given course of action,
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political circumstances and royal influence did cause each
faction to assume office with some understending of the
In­
direction of government affairs.
All of this is not to say that the English government, 
corrupt by our standards, was without justice. The English 
constitution, greatly revered by all Englishmen and their 
German King, provided a healthy balance of power by which 
differing interests were protected. The King controlled 
a vast patronages positions in the royal household, 
government sinecures, deaneries, etc., and thirty or more 
treasury boroughs, as well as pensions and p e e r a g e s b u t  
this power could be matched by a combination of several 
families of wealth with a desire to purchase office for 
their friends. And Parliament, as it was so vain in 
reminding itself and the King as well as the Americans, 
held the purse strings.
It was not only the purse strings, though, which gave 
Parliament cause for vanity and made it so glorious in 
the eyes of Englishmen. The Revolution settlement had made 
it the guardian against prerogative, and by the late 
eighteenth century the results of the Revolution had come 
to be almost universally admired. While the legislature 
was not a popular, democratic institution, it did repre­
sent the varieties of British thought and was fairly res-
15ponslve to public opinion. It was, as Ian Christie allows,
37
"appropriate for a deferential and hierarchical society.'
The King in Parliament was omnicompetent, but Parliament 
was supreme.
THE PERSONALITIES OF POWER
The English constitution, it is duly noted, is not 
and was not a rigid guide to the conduct of power. In­
evitably, then its workings have been deeply affected by 
the personalities that have filled its offices. This is 
especially true of George III, reigning over great changes 
in English government and empire. In studying Dartmouth’s 
role it is of value to cons ider briefly not only the 
King’s personality, but that of his Prime Minister in 177^ 
and 1775, Lord North.
Not surprisingly, no one person has borne so large a 
share of the blame for the difficulties of his reign as 
the unfortunate George III. Alternately caricatured as a 
tyrant, madman or idiot; even revisionist studies empha- 
size-'his failings of character. It is invariably pointed 
out that the young king was studious, conscientious, pious
and dull, each in the extreme. It is equally asserted
19that he loved Britain and adored her constitution. x ItV
is not hard to see the direction his reign took from these 
qualities; he knew he was more virtuous than the men
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around him; he devoted himself to deep thought on the 
problems of his day; he reached conclusions he felt were 
right; and his strong sense of duty to God and country gave 
him the strength to persevere In them. A youthful pro­
jection of his reign, part of an "Essay on King Alfred” 
written before he became King, embodies his estimate of 
kingly authority: "excellent were his laws, and vigorously
kept to; for he examined into everything himself." And 
further,
When all this is carefully examined, we 
may safely affirm that no good and great 
Prince . , . fond of the cause of
liberty will ever despair of restoring 
his country to virtue, freedom and glory, 
even though he mounts the throne in the 
worst corrupted times, in storms of in­
ward faction and the most threatening 
circumstances without .^ 0
Wnhappily, a person of George’s mentality was as bound to
be as rigid in his opinions as he was incorrect, and his
opinions on the American question were no exception. Like
many Englishmen he regarded the colonists as dependents,
obstreperous, undutiful, and ungrateful for the blood and
silver that the mother country had expended in securing
them. Sooner or later they must come to acknowledge their
debt to the mother country. But, if England must stand
firm in essentials, she could afford to be generous in de~
21tails, and most agreed she had been.
George’s view of the constitutional divergence between 
parent and offspring was simplistic--and indeed few in
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England at that time could conceive of a ground between
total subjection to Parliamentary authority and complete
independence. "We must either master them or totally leave
22them to themselves and treat them as aliens Compromise
would be a "sacrilegious weakness"*^ and if his ministers
were not stmg enough to maintain British rights, he
would step in their stead:
I have no doubt but the nation at 
large sees the conduct of America in 
its true light and 1 am certain any 
other conduct but compelling obedi­
ence would be ruinous and culpable, 
therefore no consideration could bring 
me to swerve from the present path 
which I think myself in duty bound to
follow.24
Without question in the King's mind, the Americans had to
be humbled and disciplined. Writing to Lord Worth in 17?4
he said:
I was much pleased with your ideas 
concerning the suspension of boun­
ties and other regulations that may 
be effected this session towards 
bringing the Americans to the ir 
duty, but I am more afraid of the
continuance of the dispute than the
colonies and I cannot think it 
likely to make them reasonable; I 
do not want to drive them to despair 
but to submission, which nothing 
but feeling the inconvenience of 
their situation can bring their pride 
to submit to.
Be had in mind his own methods as to how to bring the
Americans to this submission.
Had the Americans in prosecuting their 
ill-grounded claims put on an appearance
of mildness it might have been very 
difficult to chalk out the right path 
to be pursued; but they have boldly 
thrown off the mask and avowed that 
nothing less than a total independence 
of the British Legislature will 
satisfy them; this indeed decides the 
proper plan to be followed which is 
to stop the trade of all those colonies 
who obey the mandate of the Congress 
for non-importation, non-exportation, 
and non-consumption, to assist them 
no further with presents to the Indians 
and to give every kind of assistance to 
those that conduct themselves otherways 
which will make them quarrel among 
themselves. Their separate (sic) in­
terests must soon effect this and 
experience will then show them that 
the interference of the mother country 
is essentially necessary to prevent 
their becoming rivals.26
Part of his belief that a firm policy was necessary stemmed
from the repeal of the Stamp Acts " * . .all men seem
now to feel that the fatal compliance in 1766 has encouraged
27the Americans annually to increase their pretensions." ’ 
Confident that Heaven was with him he rigidly refused to 
alter this policy even as the direction of the war should 
have begun to show him that its failure was imminent:
"I entirely place my security in the protection of the 
divine disposer of all things, and shall never look to the 
right or to the left but steadily pursue the tract which my 
Conscience dictates to be the right one. jt was the
struggle to reach an unattainable goal, Namier says, that
2 9helped to drive him insane.
Lord North was the minister inevitably appropriate for
such a King.^0 An even-tempered, affable man of character,
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knowledge and parliamentary skill, lie possessed the
winning combination of appealing to the king and being
able to maintain a majority in Parliament and thus hold
his government together.3^ He was a good speaker, capable
of managing finances and extremely loyal. But whether
32
from loyalty, indolence or vacillation, he was willing 
to let his king be sovereign in deed as well as name.
When his own views differed from those of his king, his 
own gave way to the royal judgment, no matter how deeply 
held or how crucial the question. Though he disagreed with 
George on American policy, and longed to resign, he 
faithfully promised to remain in service and the eager 
pleas of the King urging him to do so are amongst the most 
pathetic of his letters. He too paid an emotional price 
for this inner tension between his inner feelings and the 
outward manifestation of them in the form of a nervous 
breakdown.33
George’s deep involvement in the conduct of government 
is well documented. Even so admiring a subject as Thomas 
Hutchinson was surprised at the King's knowledge of the 
affairs of Massachusetts Bay. During Hutchinson’s inter­
view in the closet in 1774 he found that George not only 
was familiar with the general situation of the colony, but 
was aware of Hutchinson’s relationship to the Olivers and
had participated in consideration of the newly appointed 
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council. But great interest in and study of the American
k2
news did not guarantee that the King would deduce reasonable
conclusions. Dartmouth sent him news of Lexington and
Concord immediately upon Its receipt in London; in his
replies he minimised its import and demonstrated his own
ill-founded optimism:
It is not improbable that some detach­
ment sent by Lieutenant General Gage 
may not have been strong enough to 
disperse the provincials assembled at 
Concord . . . .  I am far from thinking 
the general has reason to be displeased; 
the objectsof sending the detachment 
was to spike cannons and to destroy 
military stores; this has been effected. .
I therefore hope you will not see this 
in a stronger light than it deserves.35
The King then, was sovereign in deed as well as name. 
Possessed of zeal unfettered by wisdom and served by a 
prime minister with neither heart nor stomach to alter his 
ideas, the directions of his policy would have been most 
difficult to effect.
MECHANICS OF THE EXECUTIVE
Like the political modes and personalities, the 
mechanics of the English government had considerable in­
fluence on the way in which the American business was 
conducted,
Even a sovereign King had to have ministers to carry 
out his directives and since Parliament was supreme, they
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had to be men who could govern through its two Houses. A
cabinet, composed of ministers of the first rank, was and
had been for some time in existence, having grown out of the
Privy Council in the first half of the eighteenth century.
It was not, of course, developed to the point with which
we are familiar. The King controlled it primarily by his
power of appointment, which appointments, as mentioned
before, he expected to entertain no particular policies
upon entering office. Ministerial responsibility was as
yet an undeveloped concept, for in order for the ministers
to take a full collective responsibility they must be assured
that the king would accept their collective advice, and
certainly not veto bills that they had steered through
Parliament. But George III commanded a large amount of
patronage and with this degree of political independence,
he not only could, but often did, flout his ministers.3^
While Newcastle had used royal patronage to build a
strength in Parliament with which to rule George II, George
III "called the bluff on this technique" by dismissing his
ministers before they amassed such power. He regarded
38them as his "tools". The necessity for coalition cabinets
further increased his political power since he was able to
39play upon their internal divisions.
The main function of the cabinet was to give advice 
on policy and administration. It was questionable, however,
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whether the King was duty hound either to request or to re­
ceive it. And although he did not attend cabinet meetings,
his influence upon them was large: 4he very subjects of
40
deliberation were within his discretion. He kept in close
touch with his ministers both by correspondence and
meeting with them individually in his "closet". At these
sessions each minister was restricted to a consideration
of affairs within the jurisdiction of his office; with the
prime minister alone did the King discuss matters of a
41
general nature. If George and the minister concerned
agreed upon a particular issue, it usually was not brought
before the whole cabinet. Plainly, under such a system the
King was able to give full direction to government business.
A final note on the functioning of the cabinet helps
to explain the dilemma in which Dartmouth found himself
during 1774 and 1775* In reaching decisions upon the
questions it did debate, and these included American policy,
4 2a majority of members present ruled. Dissensions were 
rare once the minutes of a decision had been drawn up 
because the strength of the administration, i.e., its 
ability to remain in office, lay in unity. Thus it was 
possible that loyalty to his stepbrother might easily con­
flict with the Colonial Secretary’s personal views on 
Colonial policy.
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These were the political facts of life for Dartmouth 
as well as his contemporaries, accepted without real ques­
tion as to their efficacy or justice. That they adversely 
affected any meaningful search for a solution to the 
American problems has been indicated and will become clearer 
as the course of events is studied more closely. That 
Dartmouth, while a creature of his times in some ways was 
temperamentally out of time with them in most instances, 
should be apparent from the above and the sketch of his 
personality and character in Chapter I. Had any statesman 
been able to surmount these obstacles to bring peace and 
understanding between mother country and her colonies, it 
would not have been the amiable Earl.
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CHAPTER III
IMPEDIMENTS: THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND CORRESPONDENCE
THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT
Though Britain's empire grew and developed during the 
eighteenth century its apparatus for handling imperial 
business did not. The joint stewardship of the Secretary 
of the Southern Department and the Board of Trade, with 
responsibility for various details left to other respective 
offices, such as the War Office, was woefully out of date. 
Herein was reflected the English misconception that the 
colonies were so much a part of England that no separate
administration was necessary. In 1J6S the government re-
\
vised this system but, typically, the impetus was not
\
improvement in the handling of Colonial affairs, but con­
solidation of George Ill's political position. If, as 
Margaret Speetor points out, efficiency had been the goal of
revision, the President of the Board of Trade could have
1
been elevated to a cabinet position. A third Secretary 
was instituted instead, with the intent of stabilising 
Chatham’s ministry by partitioning Shelburne's patronage.
The Inception of the office was unfortunate, not only from
50
51
the point of view of the development of a sound American
policy, hut because it always appeared to be inferior to
that of the other two Secretaries of State creating a
continuing and delicate problem throughout Dartmouth's 
2tenure.
The American Department was organised in a similar
fashion to that of the other Departments of State| there
were two under-secretaries, a first clerk, two senior
clerks, seven ordinary clerks, a chamber and a deputy
3chamber keeper and a necessary woman. As is often the case 
with civil servants, these officers retained their positions 
even when the secretaryship changed hands, While the 
others probably played an insignificant role, the under­
secretaries during Dartmouth's tenure, John Pownall and 
William Knox, played important parts in the struggle to 
prevent separation.
Exactly how much influence they exerted on the direction 
of policy is difficult to ascertain though clearly it 
increased when they enjoyed the close personal relation­
ship that characterized Dartmouth's dealings with John
b
Pownall and Lord George Germaine's with William Knox.
Their significance becomes evident as their activities are 
examined.
Both men had what would seem to have been a sound 
background for their positions as undersecretary. Pownall,
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the older brother of a governor of Massachusetts Bay, had 
started his career in 17^1 as a clerk with the Board of 
Trade and by 1758 had risen to first secretary, ranking just 
below the President. Knox had actually lived in America for 
several years, serving as Provost Marshall and a member of 
the Council for Georgia. Contemporaries seem to have 
regarded them as intelligent and honest.^  But if their 
acquaintance with colonial affairs and their native ability 
were extensive, their points of view, especially for the 
Americans, were unfortunate.
Pownall shared the opinion and principles of Lord 
Hillsborough, and at any rate, seemed less concerned with 
solving the American problems than protecting his depart­
ment and its patronage from encroachment by either of the
2
two "ancient" secretaries. While he was not as extreme 
in his firmness as the Bedfords or even the King, he was 
far from sharing the liberal viewpoints of his brother 
Thomas. Knox, who had been unimpressed with 'democracy1 
in America, was in sympathy with the ideas of George Gren­
ville, even to the point of defending them in several
6
articulate pamphlets. Like Pownall, he was not wholly 
opposed to small concessions to the colonies, he was still
7notorious enough to be hung and burned in effigy in America.'
At least some Englishmen were concerned with the effect of 
their presence in the office of the Secretary of State, for
53
Dartmouth received an anonymous letter warning him that they
would ”carry with them . . * all the injurious and illiberal
8ideas . . * of their late Lord.” It was ironic, especially 
in Knox’s case, that though they were widely regarded as 
experts on America, they failed to understand the American 
psychology.
The chief responsibility of the undersecretaries, and
perhaps the chief way in which they exerted their influence,
was in the handling of the correspondence of the office,
with the colonies and with other departments. The bulk of
it concerned the governors who were required to report
periodically on their activities and the general and parti-
10
cular affairs of their colonies, Pownall and Knox read
this huge volume, and selected from it what it was necessary
for the secretary to see and give directions upon. Much
of the work was routine and easily--sometImes better--
handled by the undersecretaries, who drafted replies for
11
their superior’s signature. So the secretary, who at 
any rate already had a full schedule attending to his pri­
vate and political business, was spared even reading a
/ ip
great deal of the material. Some of the replies went out 
under the undersecretary’s own signatures. Besides routine 
matters, Pownall and Knox carried out their own correspon­
dence with some of the colonial governors, (for example, 
Hutchinson, Tryon, Wright and Simpson) who trusted them to
relay what was necessary to Dartmouth.
A look at an example of the handling of the more
significant pieces of mail reveals the balance of Influence
between King, cabinet, secretary and undersecretary. Using
the principals with which we are presently concerned:
Pownall reads a dispatbh from Governor Hutchinson of
Massachusetts Bay concerning a serious matter. He brings
it to Dartmouth's attention, who upon considering what his
reply should be, consults North, George III and eventually
the cabinet. Upon getting the sense of what he needs to
Ik
say, he then gives Pownall fairly specific directions but 
leaves the form and phraseology of the letter to the under­
secretary. Then a draft is submitted to the secretary for 
his signature.
The procedure takes on added significance when it is 
followed without the presence of the secretary. Dartmouth 
was often absent for weeks at a time, on trips to his 
estates at Staffordshire or Yorkshire, during which he 
expected to transact no official business. In such a case, 
Pownall presented his problem directly to the Prime Ministe 
or King for instructions, or occasionally received His
Majesty’s wishes through one of the other Secretaries of 
I5
State. The resulting letter was then sent, f&lt accompli
to Dartmouth at Sandwell for signing, or signed by the othe
16
Secretaries of State, Suffolk or Bochford.
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The only fair conclusion to draw from the above is
that the official papers reflect the policies of the secretary
and his colleagues rather than the undersecretaries unless
his subordinates happened to suggest or agree with them.
There is considerable evidence that they did both. Aside
from the initiatives demonstrated in handling the colonial
office correspondence, abstracting the year’s dispatches,
17attending levees, preparing memos for cabinet meetings 1
18and even calling a cabinet meeting occasionally, Pownall 
and Knox did originate several aspects of American policy 
and were called upon for their ideas in drafting royal
speeches to Parliament and several pieces of Colonial
19legislation. Something of the manner of origin of some
legislation is sensed in a letter from Pownall to Knox of
December 3, 1T73:
I am rejoiced to hear you are so much 
better. When you can think of business 
without being disturbed by it, I have 
got something for you that, whilst it 
amuses you*, will greatly lighten the 
burdens of your faithful servant. After 
so many years neglect of the business 
of Quebec, everything now is to be done 
in a hurry. Lord North has begged that 
he may have from us a precis of the 
affairs of Quebec from the first estab­
lishment of it, so far as regards the 
claims and complaints of the new sub­
jects, and what is passed there upon, 
etc. You know how little able I am to 
sit down to such a work, and you know 
that nobody but you or I can do it.^O
The Knox manuscripts provide information on other 
policies coming from the undersecretaries. Pownall
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apparently recommended the Boston Port Bill and Knox
conceived the idea behind the Conciliatory Proposition in
22
1775 well as making military suggestions. Letters in 
the Dartmouth manuscripts at Patshull further suggest that 
Pownall was responsible for the recall of Hutchinson and 
later the implementation of the proclamation for the 
rebellion in August of 1J75* la these ways the undersecre­
taries "exercised an influence out of proportion to their 
2k
office*.*.
The picture that emerges from this examination of how
the American business was conducted should be clear: the
sole direction of American policy did not rest with the
American Secretary. The information received by him from
the colonies was selected by subordinates, and they phrased
the dispatches that went out. Prom their experience they
were able to make acceptable and well regarded suggestions
of proper courses of action. Major issues went all the way
to the King and Cabinet before being resolved. Then the
American Secretary was indeed a "tool" for carrying out their
25joint resolution.
HEWS FROM AMERICA
In terms of sheer bulk, the volume of news from America 
left in the records of the Colonial office is impressive.
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But naturally, its significance is not to be found in its
poundage, but in its content, and it is our purpose bere to
examine and evaluate the official and unofficial information
coming to Dartmouth from the thirteen colonies, and to
speculate upon its probable effect on him.
The Colonial Office received, along "with the letters
of the various governors describing conditions within their
Jurisdictions, many enclosures in the forms of newspapers,
pamphlets, broadsides, assembly speeches and records, petitions
to the governor, minutes of town meetings, etc. Besides
these official communications, Dartmouth corresponded with
several Americans, notably Joseph Reed and Thomas Cushing,
26
had the benefit of perusing intercepted private mail,
and conversed directly with Colonial Agents and other
Americans in London. A first impression on studying this
27mine of material is that British officialdom, despite the 
ocean of time and miles separating it from its American 
subjects, could not have been ignorant of their activities 
and opinions.
The governors’ letters, even those from Bull and Went­
worth which were not nearly so full and descriptive as those 
of Bunmore and Tryon, give a remarkable picture of the 
build-up of the revolutionary fervor and organisation.
Dartmouth entered office Just after the Gasp^e incident and 
it was shortly thereafter that the extra-legal Committees
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of Correspondence were set up. Of this and all subsequent 
rebel activity, he was vividly informed. Governor Hutchin­
son of Massachusetts Bay was writing as early as 1773 of 
the spread of Boston’s truculence and its malevolent effect 
when he wrote that ’’the expectation of an union of measures 
in . . . Pennsylvania, Hew York, and Massachusetts Bay,
"2 8has raised a higher spirit here than X have ever seen before. 
After the Committees of Correspondence came the election 
of Provincial Congresses, selection of delegates to Congress, 
the Continental Congress with its restrictions on commerce 
and consumption, the arming of the rebels, Committees of 
Safety, and the final erosion of royal authority in America, 
all of which were duly chronicled in the official corres­
pondence. But to know was not to sympathize and certainly
a letter such as the following one from Hutchinson describing 
the manners of the Liberty Boys in intimidating the Tea 
Consignees in Massachusetts Bay did little to ease tensions!
On the 17th in the evening between 
one and two hundred people beset the
house . . . where Mr. Clark, another
of the consignees lives, who was at 
home with his children about him.
Their numbers, as they were passing 
greatly increased and though they 
intend to surprise yet they could 
not help discovering themselves by 
their horns and whistles, instruments 
appropriate to a Boston mob. Mr.
Clark had just time to secure his 
door, and send his female visitors
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to the upper part of the house and 
for himself and three or four male 
visitors to betake themselves to the 
lower chambers. The mob attempted 
to open the door but finding it se­
cured tried to force it. Some of the 
gentlemen called to them from the 
chamber windows, told them they were 
armed and would fire upon them if they 
did not desist. At length one of Mr.
Clark’s sons aimed at the mob who 
was forcing the door but missed him.
They withdrew for a short space and 
returned with double violence, broke 
the glass and frames of the windows 
and did other damage. Several of Mr.
Clark’s friends found their way into 
the house, and after near two hours 
the mob dispersed. The next day a 
town meeting was held and a committee 
was appointed to inquire of the con­
signees whether they had not received 
such advices as would enable them to 
answer the request of the town.
They gave a Joint answer that it was 
not in their power to comply with 
their request.^9
A man of Dartmouth’s mien was doubtless deeply shocked and 
indignant at such behavior, at not only the violence of 
the mob, but the thinly veiled use of it by the town meet­
ing .
Naturally, there was a different viet of the difficulties 
between the mother countries and her colonies coming to him 
from Joseph Reed. The brother-in-law of a London merchant 
friendly with Dartmouth, Reed had taken up a correspondence 
with the American Secretary from a sincere and not unfounded 
belief that the American cause in England had been hurt by the
6 o
30’'advices of either ignorant or interested men," Thus 
he undertook an "endeavor to inform CDartmouthJ . . . truly
31
and faithfully of our present views and situation." His 
letters attempt to present the Colonial grievances in a 
tactful way so that "perhaps by a little temporising and 
removing real grievances in the [[government’s mode of con-
ducting a particular measure'] the measure itself could be
32
preserved." He described the unfair and out-of-date pos-fed
32
rates, the "rudeness and incivility" of crown officials, 
the incompetency of Admiralty Court Officers* Most espe­
cially, he struggled to present the constitutional reasons
for American resistance, "the principle which has given rise
. 31
to the present commotion." He carefully distinguished
between a "supreme" and an "absolute" power--while he was
willing to grant the former to Parliament, he would withhold
the latter, for he could not imagine that there should be
"a more divine right . . .  in Parliament, than in the
King," To Dartmouth’s argument that the colonists should
obey the laws once enacted, he responded with "the principles
of the Revolution showing that there are certain cases
30
wherein resistance is Justifiable."
Along with American grievances and rights, Reed stressed 
unanimity and the prominence of Americans in opposition to 
Parliamentary taxation and the Tea Act in particular. In 
sending Dartmouth news of the return of Philadelphia’a tea
6l
he assured him that those who effected it were "the most
3 3considerable in both rank and property.” Throughout his
correspondence he discounted the dissentients with such
claims as ’some divisions have arisen in this place, as to
the mode of showing our sympathy with Boston; but your
Lordship may rely upon it that nine-tenths of the inhabitants
mean to show their sense of the conduct of the mother
country towards them, by adopting every prudent measure for
their relief." Always he tried to present an American
point of view. Congress was pictured as a "not illegal"
body representing "the true and real designs" of Americans
35
and perhaps serving to prevent bloodshed. In describing 
Philadelphia, he wrote, "this city has been distinguished 
for its peaceable and regular demeanor . . . there have been 
no mobs, no insults to individuals, no injury to private 
property."^
As 177^ wore on he became more urgent in his
37representations as he warned of the impending civil war.
Still he found reason to hope for an accommodation, and
suggested one to Dartmouth along these lines:
We are, indeed much misinformed if it is 
not your Lordship's opinion, as well as 
many others, that if you have the right 
[of taxation], it is not expedient to 
exercise it. Suppose this was declared 
by an act of Parliament, the Boston Acts 
repealed, and satisfaction for the tea 
made; with much deference, I submit, such
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procedure would create such a confidence, 
and excite such gratitude as would dis­
pose the colonies to concur in any 
proposition for settling the Constitution 
of America upon reasonable principles^ 
and raising the so much desired revenue; 
if that be thought too hazardous an 
experiment, I verily believe a submission 
to all acts of Parliament of general 
superintendence, and control of trade 
without reference to revenue, might be 
relied upon. If any encouragement were 
given to commissioners from the several 
assemblies, to attend the conference in 
Great Britain, and the Boston Act suspended 
in the interim, I incline to think most of 
the colonies would now accede to such a 
measure."38
Terms such as these must have appeared incredible to 
Dartmouth, and their coming from one calling himself a 
moderate, one who had "the most passionate and sincere
3 0
desire to see a reconciliation" must have discouraged 
him.
While Heed was writing him that America would never
submit to the Tea Act and that the Coercive Acts were
uniting the colonists in antagonism toward to the mother
country, General Gage reported that:
In Boston the greatest pains have been, 
and are taking to oppose all measures 
tending to open the port, by flattering 
the people with assistance from the other 
provinces--promises of collections and 
presents to enable them to subsist, and 
the happy effect of the general Congress, 
which they make no.doubt will force 
Great Britain into their own terms. On 
the other hand, several gentlemen, also 
through fear of the tyranny under which 
they live, dared not to act or speak,
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encouraged now by the late resolutions 
of the government, have ventured to step 
forth and are endeavoring to persuade the 
people to comply with the act of Parlia­
ment as the only means to save their 
town from ruin. Til’ they are pinched 
and find they are deceived in their hopes 
of support by presents and collect ions, 
the affair will probably rest in this 
situation. But the Act must certainly 
sooner or later work its own way* They 
will not agree to non-importation either 
in New York or Philadelphia, or even in
this province . .
A month earlier Reed had warned that if the Port Bill had
been founded on the belief that Massachusetts would be
isolated, that it was poorly founded--that every colony
k-1would come to her aid. In the previous December he had 
advised Dartmouth that "severities have been tried . . .
I cannot but be firtily persuaded that the repeal of this 
whole Of©a} Act would ensure the future submission . . .
)| p
to any other act of the British Parliament now in force."
At the same time Tryon advised him that repeal would be
43
dangerous and encourage illicit trade. Dartmouth’s 
manuscripts are full of such conflicting observations. A 
typical example: on May 15, 177^ Major General Haldimand
wrote from America on the predicted reaction of Boston to 
the Port Bill; "It is the opinion of many people here that 
they will acknowledge their fault." On May 20, 177^ -> Joseph 
Ward opined that "the violent measures which are adopted 
to subject the Americans will never prosper and are pregnant
64
with ruin to the nation.'1^
While Heed recommended repeal of the 'Intolerable
Acts', Governor Martin warned from Worth Carolina "that
forbearance, indulgence, relaxations and concessions serve
only to encourage usurpation and to beget new and unrea-
4 5sonable demands." From Virginia Dunmore advised him to
close American ports, cut off American trade with foreign
countries and even shut each colony off from every other 
46
colony. Despite his correspondence with the Americans 
these voices of crown officials were the ones that Dartmouth 
heard.^
And what did they say? In the first place these men
wanted to say what would be acceptable to the ministry.
This is perhaps what led Gage to over-optimistically report
on the Port Bill soon after his arrival in America as
Governor of Massachusetts Bay that "I hear from many that
the act has staggered the most presumptuous; but minds so
inflamed cannot cool at once, so it may be better to give
the shock they have received time to operate and I may find
the assembly in a better temper than usual and more inclined
48to comply with the King's expectations at Salem." Only 
a few months later he wrote to Barrington that "affairs here 
are worse than even in the time of the Stamp Act, I don't 
mean in Boston, but throughout the country. The New England 
Provinces . . . are . . .  in arms, and the question is not
now whether you shall quell the revolt in Boston, hut
49whether those provinces shall he conquered . . . "
Furthermore, colonial points of view were typically
presented in an unfavorable light. Thus Governor Penn,
in writing of an expected petition to convene the assembly
for discussion of the Boston Port Bill referred to it as
an "affrontive application," and promised darkly to "treat
50it as it deserves." In struggling to exonerate them­
selves from any blame for the unhappy turn of events the 
Governors attempted to show that it was the colonists who 
were responsible for the degeneration of relations. But 
they are not perhaps to be condemned for seeking approbation 
for their conduct for they were, after all, forced to 
follow instructions that time and distance often made 
irrelevant or inapplicable and yet binding; self-preserva­
tion dictated that they fully expiate their own behavior.
As part of this effort they tended to disregard the 
legitimate and constitutional grievances so emphasised by 
Reed and ascribed the colonial resistance to ulterior 
motives on the part of the resisters. Martin wrote that 
the opposition to government, more "specious" than "real", 
"hath arisen from the interested views of a few individuals.
The cause of Cone particular argumentj was the disappoint-
51
ment of two candidates for Treasurer's office . . . "
5 P 53This assertion was echoed by Hutchinson and Dunmore,
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the latter suggesting he have more officers to appoint so 
that he could increase the friends of government and keep 
down faction. Lieutenant Governor Bull treated the Liberty 
Boys with even more contempt when he wrote of the appeal of 
their cause that ’the uniform of cloathing invites the young 
men to enlist, and after their exercise they go to the 
tavern, and there indulge in social joys and doubtless
ck
mix politics with their wine . * «. Martin talked of a
"mob" stimulated by "sedition” and "liquor” .55 All of the
governors commonly referred to the patriots as the "lower
ranks" and the "rabble"* As for the virtue of the American
goals that Heed stressed, a letter from Martin countered in
describing an inland trip from New York to North Carolina
In the late fall of 177k* "The most false, base, and
scandalous suggestions, reports and insinuations that
unprincipled men can invent . . * are readily swallowed by
the poor deluded people, whose extreme Ignorance and
credulity, exposes them to receive every imposition that
56crafty and ill-designing men practice upon them."
The correspondence of the crown officials differs from
Reed’s in yet another way: while the Philadelphian sbessed
the unity of the Americans in opposing the designs of
Parliament upon their liberty, the governor letters almost
universally claim that the "liberty faction" is small, that,
as Hutchinson wrote in 1773> the "body of people" were "far
57from perverse", and only delufed by a few designing men.
6?
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If the faction was small, it followed, as Cage claimed,
"that if a respectable force is seen in the field, the 
most obnoxious of the leaders seized, and a pardon proclaimed
CA
for all others, government will come off victorious*”
The feeling of several of the governors, especially those 
from the southern colonies, was .that even when the rebellion
grew in daring and numbers, there were numerous moderates,
/
friend® of government who in fear of the admittedly rigorous 
retribution dealt loyalists, would not speak out. Hutchin­
son had warned in May of 177^ that the moderates would
dobe without hope until troops arrived. As late as the
summer of 1775 Campbell was writing that the back country
leaders assured him they wanted nothing but arms and
61
ammunition and 1,000 men would be raised. Bunmore pointed
out the situation of "people of the first property, and
I  believe the number greater than (might) appear, who
foresee the ruin which these disorders must bring upon the
country, and who place their hope® in the perseverance of
His Majesty and the parliament, of being rescued from the
62
tyranny of licentiousness." The plight of these loyal
V
subjects must have touched Dartmouth and he** "Likely winced at
the indignation Campbell expressed at the "tojtal neglect”
of the southern colonies $
Your Lordship will, I am sure, excuse 
my warmth when I acquaint you that
yesterday under the color of law 
they hanged and burnt an unfortunate 
wretch, a free negro of considerable 
property, one of the most valuable 
and useful men, in his way, in the 
province, on suspicion of instigating 
an insurrection for which I am 
convinced there was not the least 
ground, I could not save him my Lord I 
The very reflection harrows my soul!
I have only the comfort to think I 
left no means untried. They have 
now dipped their hands in blood. God 
Almighty knows when it will end.®3
Finally, in reviewing the information coming into 
the American office, the difficulty of time must be con­
sidered. The letters took four to six weeks to get to 
England, if the packet was on time. It took several more 
weeks for the news to be digested, action taken and replies 
made, and then another four to six weeks before these 
reached America. The Inherent obstacles are obvious.
After hostilities began the government packet was discon­
tinued and communication became still more uncertain, but 
even before this letters often didn’t get through. Several
of Hutchinson's letters in the Public Record Office are
6kmarked "duplieate--original not received." Some very 
significant news was late in coming, for example, the offi­
cial version of Lexington and Concord arrived some 12 days 
after a patriot account had Jostled London. The time lag 
also made planning difficult, especially during debate of 
the Boston Port Bill. There was not enough time to send 
across the Atlantic to see whether Boston was willing to
69
pay for the tea before passing a punitive measure, or to
give her the alternative. Similarly it would have taken too
long to assess the effects of the Port Bill before passing
65
the other Coercive Acts . Other pitiful examples of this
are seen in the fact that for all practical purposes the
Conciliatory Proposition was rendered obsolete by the news
of Lexington and Concord, and in Dartmouth’s losing battle
to postpone the Proclamation of Rebellion until after the
Second Continental Congress had been heard from.
To summarize, the news from America, while full, was
conflicting and prejudiced. It was not a question, as some
66
sources have implied, of not having enough information, 
or not having seen the petitions of the colonists.
Unhappily, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, 
Dartmouth favored his official dispatches over unofficial 
"advices1* $ and while they fanned his hopes for conciliation, 
the same time they alienated him from the very Americans 
he hoped to conciliate.
CHAPTER III
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CHAPTER IV 
THE POLICY OF COERCION
INDEPENDENCY IN ACTION AS WELL AS DECLARATION
The Boston Tea Party was the turning point in Lord 
Dartmouth1® thinking on the American guestIon* Before the 
Tea Party he had hoped, albeit naively and vainly that a 
policy of non-aggravation on both sides would suffice to 
heal the differences between colony and mother country.
He did not really desert this policy after the Tea Party, 
but he realised that the differences could no longer be 
totally ignored*
When that ill-disguised tribe of Indians chose to 
repudiate Parliamentary sovereignty by throwing the East 
India Companyfs tea into Boston Harbor, they were destroy­
ing private property, a crime that cost them their best 
friends in England* More important for Dartmouth, however, 
they were committing an act that could not be tabled by the 
British Parliament. In their conversation on the Declara­
tion of Independency that the Massachusetts Assembly had 
made in reply to Hutchinson*® defense of Parliamentary 
prerogative, Franklin had told Dartmouth that "It I® words
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only. Acts of Parliament are still submitted to there.
Ho force is used to obstruct their execution. While that
1is the case, Parliament would do well to turn a deaf ear.1
But here was outright disobedience. Dartmouth was stunned 
2
and grieved. He had considered himself a "real friend to
3the constitutional rights and liberties of America." He
had thought it likely that the repugnant Tea Act would be
overturned in the session of Parliament underway when news
of the turbulence arrived* How, he wrote his friend John
Thornton, the colonists should know
how fatally and effectually they have . . 
shut the door against all possibility 
of present relief for any of the things 
they complain of, and how utterly vain it 
must be to expect that Parliament will 
ever give it to them till there appears 
to be a change in their temper and con­
duct . CO. would be thought as mad as 
they if were to say a word of repeal­
ing the tea duty now.^
To Dartmouth, whether or not Parliament had the right
to lay the tea duty, to resist Parliament’s authority by
opposing the execution of the law in the manner ©f Boston
was "clearly treasonable . . . upon the principles of every
3government upon earth* In his mind the taxation question- 
which he had felt and still did feel could be held in 
abeyance--must now be shunted aside by this larger question 
of whether the laws of Parliament would be submitted to 
in America* "If the people of America say no," he wrote
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privately to Reed,
they say in effect that they will 
no longer be a part of the British 
Empire: they change the'whole ground
of the controversy--they no longer 
contend that Parliament has not a 
right to enact a particular provision-- 
they say that if has no right to con­
sider them as at all within its 
Jurisdiction. 3
Either the colonists submitted, or they were independent.
While Dartmouth could pose this alternative in theory, 
he could not bring liimself to accept the latter choice.
"We are yet one Empire,1 he had told Franklin in 1773,^
and in 177^ there was still, for Dartmouth, "hope, that
p
principles of another nature will prevail."
At the same time it was obvious to him that some action
stronger than hope must repair the assault to Parliament's 
authority. Franklin had wisely warned him some months 
before that "violent measures against the province will not 
change the opinion of the people. Force [can] do no g o o d ,
But lack of action had not preserved the peace. Sir Francis 
Bernard wrote the Secretary a general rebellion could be
5averted if the government would pursue coercive measures,
an opinion that must have struck a responsive chord in
Dartmouth, for he wrote Hutchinson that
I am sensible how greatly the * 
constitutJfcnal imbecility of the 
government in . . . Massachusetts 
Bay is increased by popular preju­
dices, and yet, the vigilance, the 
firmness, and the activity of the 
civil power, are the only circum­
stances from which the subject can
79
expect . » . protection in the exercise 
of his lawful commerce * It is upon these 
efforts that the preservation of the 
public peace must depend . • . *
Ihat this civil power could not cope with its problems
at this time became evident from the Governor’s letters
that the ’Indians’ would not be tried and the tea would
not be paid fot J  Clearly, Massachusetts must be made
to obey the laws of its mother country. As he wrote Gage
concerning the governments
It is not only its dignity and reputa­
tion, but its power, nay its very existence 
depends upon the present moment; for 
shcuLd those ideas of independence, which 
some dangerous and ill-designing persons 
here are artfully endeavoring to instil
into the minds of the King’s American
subjects, once take root, that relation 
between this kingdom and its colonies, 
which is the bond of peace and power will 
soon cease to exist and destruction must 
follow disunion.
Further, Dartmouth’s sympathy towards the grievances 
the Americans claimed was limited by his English point of 
view and the prejudiced accounts of the governors. He 
failed to understand the very real American fear of British 
tyranny; he was certain, he wrote Keed, that ”1 need not 
take pains to convince you of the absurdity of the idea 
which has been held out to the common people in inflammatory 
papers on your side of the water, that the intention of 
government is to enslave the people of America . . . ” He
8o
felt further that ’’the liberties of America are not so 
much in danger from anything Parliament has done, or is 
likely to do here, as from the violence and misconduct of 
America itself.” The letters of the British governors had 
brought him to believe that the radicals were small in 
number and that while they had perhaps developed a wide 
following, the people had been duped by an unscrupulous, 
ambitious, few. Here the effects of the governors* view­
points on Dartmouth*s thinking were forceful and unfortu­
nate. He was also discouraged by their intransigence; 
writing to Wentworth in Hew Hampshire he had admitted that, 
”1 cannot suggest any step to be taken that would not be
9more likely to strengthen, than remove their prejudices."
Boston had an old reputation as a bad apple in the
barrel of colonial grievances. Her reputation sank even
lower when Franklin*s part in the publication of the Whately
letters became known only a week after the news of the tea 
10
party arrived. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Apsley, wrote
Dartmouth that it was necessary "to mark out Boston and
11
separate that town from the rest of the delinquents."
In fact, North told Hutchinson after his arrival in
England, the mother country had been patient long enough;
'some changes should have been made before, especially after
the Assembly's Declaration of Independency the previous 
12
summer. "There was" Dartmouth had written "no room to 
hope for the restoration of order and regular government
8l
till the sentiments of those who see the necessity of a 
due acknowledgement of the supreme power of the whole 
empire, and the absurdity of a contrary doctrine, shall
lo
become the prevailing and ruling principle of the province." ^
SSCUBING THE DEPENDENCE OF THE COLONIES
Dartmouth's conclusion that a coercive policy was
necessary and justified is not surprising in view of the
general British reaction to the tea party. From the King
down, feeling was against the Bostonians. The colony's
own agent was shocked and hoped for a speedy reparation from
the town; even Chatham could not condone the destruction
Of the private property of an innocent party. ”1 suppose
we never had since we were a people so few friends in 
IkBritain," Franklin lamented to Cushing; "the violent 
destruction of the tea seems to have united all parties 
agains t (W) ." Most Englishmen not only believed that 
coercion was justified, but also that it would succeed in 
bringing Boston to terms. The King wrote to North, relay­
ing a conversation with Gage, in which Gage said, "they will 
be lions whilst we are lambs; but if we take the resolute 
part, they will undoubtedly prove very meek, t^age] thinks
four regiments . . . sent to Boston . . . are enough to
15prevent any disturbance." In view of such sentiments, 
the political situation of the times, and the relationship
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of North to his step-brother and to the King, Dartmouth
would not have been able to make his opinion prevail, even
if his personal opinion had been against coercion.
Accordingly, Dartmouth wrote Gage,
It is fit I should acquaint you that it 
is the King’s firm resolution, upon the 
unanimous advice of his confidential 
servants, to pursue such measures as 
shall be effectual for securing the de­
pendence ^ gf the colonies upon this 
Kingdom.
Exactly what this "resolute part" was to be was a question
of some difficulty.
Dartmouth had been aware, as in his letter to Rockingham
in 1768, that the letters from the governors must be
"partial" and "prejudiced"; but perhaps because of that
"foible" of which Hutchinson had accused him, of believing
people better than they were, he persisted in the wishful
thinking that the violences committed in America were the
actions of only a small group. It followed logically that
if that small group could be punished, if they could be weeded
out of the troubled Boston garden, that the friends of
government would spring up and dutiful obedience to his
Majesty’s laws would return.
News of the destruction of the tea had arrived in
London on the twentieth of January, 177^• On the twenty-
ninth began a series of cabinet meetings to determine what
17
particular measures would be adopted. Exhibiting his concern
CO
for the lawful conduct of government and Ills belle] w
narrowness of opposition to it, Dartmouth suggested
the King direct the Governor of the province to mov« ihe seat
of government to a place least likely to he influenced by
the town of Boston, and to move the customhouse to another 
18
port# At the same meeting the Attorney and Solicitor
General were directed to consider whether the actions of
19
Boston were treasonous. The following day the cabinet 
discussed measures to be pursued if the report of the law
officers should conclude that there was adequate ground to
20warrant criminal proceedings against the Indians. A
fortnight later, though the idea of criminal proceedings
was still being considered, it had been agreed that the
Boston Port Bill and the Massachusetts Government Act would
20be presented to Parliament*
The Port Bill, closing the port to ail commerce, was
the first of the acts to become law, and it passed with
20
almost no opposition in either house, Labaree reports
that the Earl of Buckinghamshire had vigorously proposed
punishing the town by stopping Boston’s commerce with 10,000
troops and a fleet of Ik sail, on February 1. Dartmouth got
him to withdraw the motion then because all of the American
23
news was not yet In*
This particular action then was not extraordinary to 
Englishmen in 177^, and the idea of assessing a whole town
Qk
for the crimes of some individuals was not regarded as novel
either. North pointed out in Parliament that it could not
be helped if the innocent were punished with the guilty,
for the innocents had failed to act against the guilty and
2b
therefore the whole town must make restitution. Even
Franklin told Cushing that "tho# the mischief was the act of
persons unknown, yet as probably they cannot be found or
brought to answer for it, there seems to be some reasonable
25
claim on the society at large in which it happened." In
Dartmouth’s papers is a memo in his own hand considering how
Boston was to be assessed, in which it is clear he planned
26to assess the whole town. It is very probable then, in 
view of this and his own feelings as relayed to Thornton 
and Heed, that the American Secretary supported the Port 
Bill.
It is interesting that the action was taken by the
ministry, through Parliament. The Attorney General and
Solicitor General had ruled that the King could remove the
customhouse on his own authority. As mentioned above, Knox
tells us that Pownall made the suggestion of the Bill and
Labaree claims that the reason for It was to stiffen the
punishment by not allowing ships to use another customhouse
27
in Boston harbor. But for Dartmouth this must have had 
a deeper meaning: his reason for supporting coercion was to
bring the colonies to obey the laws of Parliament. When 
Franklin had admonished him that mere troops could not
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force an acknowledgement of Parliamentary supremacy from
the colonists, Dartmouth had agreed. "I do not know, that
force would he thought of; but perhaps an act may pass to
28lay them under some inconveniences . . . " Now he believed
that the "inconveniences” of the port closing would force
the Bostonians to pay for the tea, and in doing so they
would be submitting to an act of Parliament whether they
admitted it or not* In an interview with Hutchinson and
George III in the King’s closet after the governor had
arrived in London in July, Dartmouth clarified his feeling
on what Bostonians needed to do to reopen their port.
Hutchinson was concerned that no specific acknowledgement
of the right of Parliament to tax them was required, as he
knew it would not be forthcoming. Dartmouth agreed that
this was not necessary and said that
Such orderly behaviour in the inhabitants 
in general as would enable the governor 
to represent to {the King) that there 
was an apparent disposition to give no 
molestation to persons who would carry on 
their trade . . * conformable to law; 
and the assembly and the towns abstain­
ing from these offensive roles and 
resolves and encouraging disorders . . .
may be considered evidence of such sub- 
miss ion."29
"Actions speak louder than words", the King added, acquiescing 
in what Dartmouth had said. Here again is Dartmouth1s feeling 
that discussion of rights should be avoided; if the colonists 
would just obey and not argue about Parliamentary supre­
macy, Britain would not force them to admit it.
Dartmouth had written Hutchinson that only two measures
"a suspension . . .  of all the privileges at present enjoyed
by the town of Boston as the seat of government and a place
of trade, and an effectual and immediate punishment of
those who had been the ringleaders in the very criminal
30
transactions there*" -- were under review. If there was to 
be any hope for an end to the troubles however, some reform 
was necessary. Changes in the government of Massachusetts 
Bay were first thought of in connection with moving the seat 
of government from Boston to a less turbulent place. It 
was a short step from this to altering the constitution in 
such a way as to cure its "democratical" evils--which 
Dartmouth among others felt were the reasons that that 
province excelled all others in undutiful conduct. Knox 
apparently suggested changing the mode of securing members
31
of the Council from election to Crown appointment. This
had been considered before, and now Dartmouth agreed to it.
It is not difficult to see why in reading some of Hutchinson
letters, such as one speaking of the upper house which "by
so many changes made in it for seven or eight years" is
"so modelled that nobody is left to oppose the designs of
the new modellers of government with the least degree of
spirit or, in most cases, to say nay to the proposals made 
32
to them.’ Writing of the Council to Gage shortly after
receiving this letter Dartmouth said "any hope of proper
33advice or assistance from them would be vain." According
to both Knox and the King, Dartmouth approved this part of
the Government Act; but, Knox wrote, "neither of us wished
35to make any further alterations in the charter." As it 
turned out this was a minority opinion in the Cabinet and 
Dartmouth was overruled. Knox blames the extension of char­
ter changes to town meetings and juries on Sir Frances 
Bernard who "unluckily came to town" at that time with plans 
for them. Pownall told Hutchinson that he had not favored 
altering the constitution, even the Council* since he 
believed that if the Governor would exert himself in using 
his negative he might get a good Council under the estab­
lished method. "Lord Mansfield," however, "pushed the matter 
and upbraided [the cabinet for] their late irresolution,"^ 
which resulted in passage of the Government Act. A letter 
from George III to North tends to support Pownall’s version 
as he says "the more I reflect on Lord Mansfield's opinion .. 
concerning the altering of the Charter; the more I am 
confirmed in the propriety (of In any event, the
unit rule prevailed in the cabinet and though Dartmouth was 
outvoted on part of the Bill he was called upon to defend 
it in Parliament, where it received more opposition than had 
the Port Bill, but was in no danger of not passing.
Dartmouth was also anxious to bring to justice the 
particular individuals who had so flagrantly insulted the 
mother country. When the cabinet met on February
88
Dartmouth asked the legal officers; MD>o) these acts amount 
to the crime of high treason? If so who Care! the persons 
chargeable and how should they be p r o s e c u t e d ? The reply 
to the first question, gives on February IX was ”y««w* "Aa 
attempt, concerted with much deliberation and made with opes 
force . . . to obstruct the execution of an Act of Parliament 
imposing a duty on tea and to put a general restraint upon 
the exercise of lawful trade” was treasonous, amounting to
on
“the levying of war against his Majesty.' The further 
conclusion was that the accused could be tried either in
America or in England, based on an old statute dating back
to the days of Henry Till. Since this answer was affirmative, 
Dartmouth was anxious to ensure punishment of the guilty 
because of his over-optimistic belief that their adherents 
were small in number and that punishment would set an exam­
ple. Besides they deserved punishment* His feelings were
well displayed in a conversation with Hutchinson* According 
to the Governor, he "spake with great ©motion; that he was 
hot one who thirsted for blood; but he could not help saying
that he wished to see H_______K and A_______jae brought to
the punishment they deserved: and he feared peace would not
be restored until some examples were made, which would deter
jj | A
the others.*1 By the end of February it was decided that
there was not enough evidence to bring specific charges and
hi
the idea of Crown prosecution was dropped*
While Dartmouth was anxious for the radicals to be
brought to justice, he did not support their being transported
to England for trial. He had opposed such a measure in 1772
when it was considered in connection with the Gaspee incident
because he believed "it legal for the person to take his
k2
trial in the country where the offence was committed."
Hie position had not changed, in spite of the fact that 
everyone in England realized that conviction would have been 
impossible in Massachusetts. If the conviction of rebel 
leaders was not possible, it was also apparent that crown 
officers engaged to suppress defiance of Parliament's laws 
might be brought to trial "before persons who do not ac-
.>3
knowledge the validity of those laws. Their conviction
would be certain. The fear arising from this logic was that
the King's servants would be less than zealous in performing
their duties, which in the case of Massachusetts Bay might
prove disastrous. The solution, ae in the other instance
of a partial jury, was to bring such an offender to England
where he would be assured of a "fair trial." Dartmouth
could not support such a step in this case any more than he
could have when the accused were persons he very much wanted
to see convicted; but he was aware of the difficulty and
suggested "that offenders of that particular province should
A3
be amenable to the Courts of Justice of Nova Scotia." The 
Administration of Justice Act, drawn to protect those enforcing 
the law in Massachusetts, was henceforth broadened to provide
90
for trial either in England or another colony, and Dartmouth, 
having effected what was for him a significant change, 
supported it.
The Quartering Act, despicable as it seemed to the 
Americans, was only the natural result of the others as far 
as the ministry was concerned. Parliament had decreed that 
the laws would be enforced; it must send officers of the 
Crown to enforce them and these must be housed. If the 
colony did not provide quarters, then the commander*-in­
chief could billet his troops in such empty houses, barns 
and outhouses as he thought necessary. Dartmouth could not 
have objected to this since he now felt that soldiers were, 
needed to keep order. The practice was essentially the 
same as that long employed in England itself.
The colonists included a fifth act, The Quebec Act, 
as part of this group they labelled "intolerable". This 
law is now generally regarded as a most enlightened act of 
statesmanship, carefully designed to meet the needs of 
non-English subjects. But in an atmosphere clouded by 
Parliament's alteration of the Massachusetts Charter, it 
seemed in America to be part of a gradual plot to subvert 
liberties and establish tyranny. The Act legalized hated 
Homan Catholicism, discontinued English law and land-holding 
practices in favor of French, and denied to Quebec the elected 
assembly promised at the end of the Seven Years War. Even 
a moderate like Joseph Reed could not place this act in its
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perspective, for he wrote the Secretary:
The idea of bringing down the Canadians 
and savages upon the English colonies, 
is so inconsistent not only with mercy, 
but the justice and humanity of the 
mother country, that I cannot allow myself 
to think that your.Lordship would promote 
the {Quebec Bill.^ j ^
The ministry, however, especially Dartmouth, knowing the 
purity of their own motives, was never able to fully com­
prehend the American reaction.
Considerable criticism has been heaped upon Dartmouth 
for his role in these proceedings. How could a "friend 
of America" take part in them with honor? The answer to 
this question should already be clear. Dartmouth believed 
in the supremacy of Parliament; he was horrified at the 
defiance of the law that had been exhibited by, as he 
thought, a small group of radicals; he was determined to 
vindicate the authority of the mother country. Although 
he supported a policy of coercion, he was still attached 
to his former plan of letting tempers cool, and he did not 
want to proceed beyond the necessary vindication to inflame 
the colonists further. He still hoped for an eventual 
repeal of the Tea Act. But when the general rancour of 
British reaction drove his colleagues to harsher measures, 
he had no choice but to acquiesce in the decision of the 
Cabinet. He could neither protest the policy aloud nor 
resign, since it would weaken his step-brother *s ministerial
92
position in a time of crisis. Certainly too he must have
felt that he had some leeway in putting the laws into effect.
For example, in spite of the fact that troops and a military
governor were sent, he Instructed Gage to
use every endeavor to quiet the minds 
of the people, to remove their preju­
dices, and by mild and gentle persua­
sion, to induce submission on their 
part . . . 4-5
As Bargar points out, a Hillsborough or a Germain would have
given a different spirit to coercion.
ROOM FOR HOPS
Gage left England in April with his instructions and 
news of the Boston Port Bill, which was to take effect 
June 1. Thus it was the middle of May before the colonies 
received definite word of the ministry's action and well 
into summer before they learned of the other "Intolerable 
Acts", the Massachusetts Government Act, the Administration 
of Justice Aet£ the Quartering Act, and the Quebec Act.
No one in England, Including, as has been seen, Dartmouth
and Gage, thought that these acts would have the desired
effects on the colonists immediately. So the familiar delay 
of trans-Atlantic communication and the expected time of 
adjustment to Parliament's firm intentions, combined to 
keep Dartmouth suspended in an agony of vain hope for the 
summer and fall of 1774.
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Optimism reigned at first. Writing to Gage in reply
to a letter of May 19, Dartmouth exulted:
The state in which you found things . .
was better than I expected, and from 
what has passed since, . . . there is 
room to hope . . . that the tranquillity
of the Province, and the authority of 
the Government in it, will speedily be 
restored . . . ^
As time wore on there was less and less "room to hope", but
Dartmouth, true to his nature, would not give up. In August
he wrote privately to Gage from Blackheath expressing con-
kS
fidence in his ability to restore peace. His feelings
at this time were further reflected in a letter that was
probably drafted by Pownall:
It is evident from the dispatches I 
had the satisfaction to receive from you . . 
that although the measures adopted res­
pecting the Province of Massachusetts Bay
had not yet had, and will not perhaps for
some time have their complete effect, yet
that they have so far succeeded as to 
encourage many good men to stand forth in 
opposition to those who are wickedly, but,
I trust, vainly, endeavouring to urge the 
people to violent . . . resolutions. 9
At this time there was still no expectation that the other
colonies would come to Boston's aid; when Boston realized
that no assistance would be forthcoming, the letter insisted,
"the hour of distress must soon come that will, I hope,
awaken the people to a right sense of their situation . . .
It is much to be lamented that . . . Boston . . . (could-)
still . . . believe that the measures they . * . adopt are
likely to attain the . . . union with this count'
47profess to desire." Wo redress would be possible
obedience first.
During this period of waiting, great hopes were placed
on the Congress, and Hutchinson wrote in his Diary that
Dartmouth had told him nothing would be done until news of
50
what had transpired there arrived. Apparently there were
no great fears of the results of this convention in spite
of its extra-legal origin. Worth told Hutchinson in early
August that he had heard that the orders of merchants had
been large and he felt on this account that non-importation
51
agreements were unlikely. Most optimistic was William Knox
who believed that Congress would consider some plan for a
central government and find it so impracticable that they
would accede gladly to the supreme controlling power of
Parliament, for defense against enemies and to prevent
52
quarrels amongst themselves. As for Dartmouth, he expressed
"great concern" at the method since grievances would have a
more potent effect coming from the individual colonies, but
he still "wishCed) that the result of their proceedings may
be such as not to cut off all hope of that union which is
5 3so essential to the happiness of both."
Disillusionment came gradually. Bull wrote as early 
as July that far from having any "happy effect towards 
composing disturbances", the Acts of Parliament had "nised 
a universal spirit of jealousy against Great Britain, and
95^
of unanimity towards each other.” Other governors were 
telling a like tale; by September Gage was forced to write 
that "the flames of sedition have spread universally through­
out the country." The only remedy he could suggest was "to 
secure the friends of government in Boston, and to reinforce
the troops here with as many more as could possibly be 
55
collected." Hutchinson found Dartmouth beginning to des-
56
pair. The Secretary wrote disconsolately to Gage that
while he "had entertained hopes” that the "popular phrenay"
would subside, it now appeared that:
notwithstanding the assistance of so 
large a military force sent purposely 
to support the authority of civil 
government! they still have it in their 
power to trample upon it with impunity 
and to bid defiance to all controul.
£sic)" 57
Even with the writing so plainly on the wall, Dartmouth
could conclude his letter with "X cannot but persuade myself
that even in the Hew England governments . . . there are
many friends of the constitution who would stand forth,
57under the protection of Government.”
Embarrassingly, it was not possible to protect them.
Ho troops could be spared from present forces or raised
anew before winter. The Cabinet decided to send three ships 
5 8of the line and Dartmouth impractically inquired of Gage
if it was possible to disarm the people of Massachusetts Bay,
59Bhode Island and Connecticut. Gage could not keep order 
and yet the Secretary asks him to effect disarmament,*
vn
9 6
Hiteheson says that the Cabinet had decided to postpone
6Q
mobilization, to continue attempts to isolate Massachusetts*
We can only suppose that distance is partly responsible for 
this lack of realism on the part of Dartmouth and the 
ministry.
English opinion on the colonies had begun to harden.
Hutchinson had recorded in mid-October that Dartmouth*e
earlier hopes for a repeal of the tea duty had faded. "*This
could not be,* he said, * they would not believe the kingdom
61
was in earnest.1*’ What was the essence, the vital point
of the dispute for the colonists, could not be given up.
Even as liberal a plan as that advanced by former Governor
Thomas Povnall, for a Congress of Deputies to be chosen by
the American Assemblies with a Crown Moderator, did not
envision the giving up of Parliamentary supremacy. As
Dartmouth himself put it "‘Parliament can do nothing which
will do so much as carry any appearance of conceding to such 
62a claim.1" The King wrote Worth in September that while 
he had"no objection” to seeing that no "feeh taxes” were 
laid on the Americans, he was clear "there must always be
/* Q
one tax to keep up the right."
Worse news was yet to come: at the end of October word
arrived that the Congress had adopted the Suffolk Hesolves 
urged by the Boston delegation. These resolves proclaimed 
home rule for the colonies, excepting only that "we
cheerfully consent to the operation of such Acts of the
British Parliament, as (regulate) our external commerce
for the purpose of securing . . . commercial advantages
6^
(for) the whole empire.” They further stipulated the 
Inviolability of their Charters, trial by their peers, and 
right of assembly* the unconstitutional!ty of appointed 
Councils, and ended by proclaiming that all acts adopted 
since 1763, demonstrating “a system formed to enslave
(Aljt
America, must be repealed. In order to force Britain 
into such repeal, the Congress voted "An Association" 
providing non*importation, non*consumption and non**exporta­
tion, of British goods.
Dartmouth was "thunder struck" at the news and queried 
Hutchinson anxiously as to whether the newspaper accounts 
could be relied on. When the governor assured him they
were likely genuine the Secretary could only regret that it
65 65
was now impossible to give way. Both Pownall and Knox
were similarly afffected, the latter "much altered" after
his earlier optimism and told Hutchinson that "all treaty
is over . . . the first thing will be to let America know,
that Britain will support its authority and then concede what
66shall be thought fit.” Barth was similarly disposed
saying that "it was no purpose any longer to think of
expedients: the Province was in actual rebellion, and must
be subdued . . , the Acts must and should be carried Into 
6 7
execution,” He further informed Hutchinson: "I will
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venture to tell you that Parliament was dissolved on this 
account-*that we might, at the beginning of a Parliament
take such measures as we could depend upon a Parliament to
67prosecute to effect.* The King may have influenced the 
darkness of Horth*s mood in this conversation with the gover­
nor, for George III had written his minister the night 
before that:
I am not sorry that the line of conduct 
seems now chalked out , . . . The Hew 
England governments are in a state of 
rebellion, blows must decide whether they 
are to be subject to this country or 
Independent. ^
Along with the Resolves and the Association, Congress
had designed a Petition to the King praying for redress
of their grievances. It is indicative of how far the
Americans had come towards a federal concept of empire that
they desired Franklin, and several other agents and friends
of America, to present it directly to the King, hoping for
his intercession in their battle with Parliament. Franklin
wrote Charles Thomson, Secretary of the Congress, that he
had instead, decided to present it to Dartmouth "that being
69the regular official method.”
Unfortunately the petition was not delivered until 
almost two months after news of Congress's other actions 
had arrived and obviously with the disposition of British 
officialdom already soured by those actions, the petition 
was destined for an unfavourable reception. Its first
99
difficulty, however, came from the 1 friends * Congress
had designated to submit it to the throne. Of the six
named, three, among them Edmund Burke, "declined being
concerned with i t a n d  another was out of town. Paul
Wentworth gave, as his reason to Pownall, that the petition
was "an assertion of all their claims in a very high tone
TOand with very offensive expressions*”1 Eventually,
Franklin, Lee and Bollan, immoderates in British eyes,
took it to Dartmouth. Diplomatic as always, and still
anxious not to shut the door on discussions that might bear
T1fruit, he called it a "decent and proper petition," ' and
69promised, after looking at if himself, to deliver it to
George III. We can only assume that the Secretary caused
this added delay in order to be assured that it was not
so intemperate as to further alienate an already embittered
sovereign* Ironically, for the colonists, the King then
laid it before Parliament on the nineteenth of January, with
all of the other papers on America.
11 was Congress1s total action rather than the petition
itself which caused it to be eventually ignored by the
legislature. As Hutchinson wrote, in spite of its "decent
and respectful language," it could not be approved because
"all the proceedings of Congress, from which the address
72
cannot be separated, are utterly inadmiesable. At his
Levee on December twenty-second North had told the governor;
100
"'They did not deny the right.*" But, Hutchinson replied,
"'They . . . accompany it with papers, which deny the right.1”
After further discussion on the composition and merits of
the petition Hutchinson wrote:
I could plainly perceive that it would 
have been very agreeable to him to have 
found something in D O  that would 
lead to an accomodation, and if if had 
not been for the extravagance of the 
Resolves, Association and Addresses 
passed by this convention, notwithstanding 
the illegality of their assembling, which 
would have been winked at, the Petition 
would have been attended to."73
Dartmouth echoed this attitude in a letter to an unknown
addre ssee;
, . . The people of America have never 
taken one step that has the least appearance 
of a tendency towards reconciliation and 
accomodation: had the proceedings of the
Congress, illegal as that assembly is, carried 
with them any disposition of this sort, I can 
have no doubt that government would have 
been ready to give all due encouragement to 
such disposition."7^
Without such disposition there was little the government
could do.
In spite of growing disgust at America and the seating 
of a new Parliament, the ministry was slow to take action. 
Amidst despatches from Gage warning that "civil government 
is near its end" and letters from New York demonstrating th&t
even that colony wherein loyalty was anticipated as nowhere
else, was on the verge "conspiring" with her sisters against
7hParliamentary claims, the cabinet's only action was to
IPX
query the Attorney and Solicitor General on whether treason
and rebellion were being perpetrated, and if so, to
draft a proclamation calling on the guilty to surrender or
75be treated as traitors* A circular letter was sent in 
mid-December notifying the governors of his Majesty’s 
’’resolution" to withstand every attempt to weaken "the 
authority of the f^upreme legislature over all his Majesty’s 
dominions," and Parliament’s approbation thereof in order 
to remove those false impressions which have been made * . * 
and put an end to these expectations of support of their 
unwarrantable pretentions, which have been held forth by 
artful and designing men. !fhere was, as so much faith 
had been placed in his mission, a growing dissatisfaction 
with Gage for his "inactivity and irresolution" because 
things had not gone well.^ Any definitive action was 
postponed until after Christmas when the outcome of the 
petition would be clear, although no one questioned the 
need for some definitive action. As Dartmouth explained to 
Hutchinson on one occasion when he asked the governor’s 
advices
fhere was no doubt that every one who 
had signed the Association, was guilty 
of treason, and if he was to be direc­
ted by the resentment natural upon 
the first news of such an insult, the 
most vigorous measures would immediately 
be pursued In order to punishment,
{j3ie3 but it was an affair to be well 
considered, and deliberated upon. 80
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Perhaps part of the Secretary*a decision to deliberate at 
length ataft&ed from a desire to give time for other at tamp t a
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CHAPTER 7 
COERCION AID COHClIIATIQI
SEARCHING FOR COMMOH GEOUHB
When the neve of the summer of 17?4 and finally the
action.# of Congress- demonstrated that the colonies were
united and that the coercive acts had failed to make them
obey Parliamentary laws, Dartmouth saw the need of alter**
lag the stance of mother country to colony. He did not
desert his earlier belief that the colonies deserved tome
punishment and must he brought* by "inconveniences" to
1
obey Parliament, but he realised that since the steps taken 
to bring this about had not succeeded, something else must 
be done# lie- approach in the winter of 1?75 was twofold? 
to remind the colonies publicly that the mother country was 
determined to maintain its authority, while nevertheless 
demonstrating its benevolence and good intention®! and to 
seek in person or privately to come to an understanding with 
American leaders# Unfortunately, each party to the dispute 
had now reached an extremespo sit ion from which they could not 
compromise* Dartmouth, as a moderate, was caught in the 
middle and blamed by both sides*
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While Congress and Parliament made their demands public, 
Dartmouth was enough of a diplomat to know that some of them 
had to be negotiated in private. He still believed that 
union "upon some general constitutional plan is certainly 
very just" and, he wrote to Lt. Governor Golden of Hew York,
"I have no doubt of its being yet attainable through some
2
channel of mutual consideration and discussion."
Early in the fall Dartmouth had supported an idea of 
Pownall's for a royal commission to go from England to treat 
with the colonials, or in Pownall’s words "to enquire into 
the causes of the disorders and discontent existing at pre-
„3
sent in America. Both sides must give way to settle a
dispute he knew; as Knox wrote later:
However determined we all were that the 
colonies should obey the sovereign 
authority of Parliament, we all thought 
taxation ought to be given up in practice, 
and that the colonies should be invited 
to make some proposition for the 
equivalent. I went further, and thought 
there were many unjust as well as impolitic 
restraints on the foreign commerce of the 
colonies and Ireland. 4
This commission would facilitate negotiations by appointing
three representatives of the King "to meet deputies from the
4
colonies, to discuss and settle all claims." Quite 
properly, for Pownall and his colleagues, Parliament was to 
confirm What had been agreed upon, providing of course, that 
it was approved by the legislature. The idea was tentatively 
accepted by the Cabinet on the condition that the charge to
Ill
the commissioners was satisfactory to them. Knox complains
that Povnall then spoiled his own idea by maneuvering to
become part of the Commission) when he found he would not
be going to America as one of its members, he altered the
format to provide one high commissioner to whom he would be
secretary. This single commissioner, again according to
Knox, then had too much authority and dignity to suit the
Cabinet who feared it would seem too much like an American
Parliament and rejected the whole idea. While both Mansfield
and Dartmouth still favored it, the King, Bedford and Suffolk
did not, so for political reasons, the Prime Minister 
5
dropped it.
But "Dartmouth still insisted that something should be
If-
held out to the colonies" and since this "ehannel of mutual 
consideration and discussion” had not worked out he began 
exploring another in the form of a series of private meetings 
between his personal physician, Dr. Fothergill, David Barclay, 
and Benjamin Franklin. For diplomacy's sake, the meetings
were shrouded in secrecy and it is not now apparent how they
3were initiated. Fothergill, a widely respected Quaker and
a ”Whig of decided opinions,” with "close ties and sympathies
with the American colonists, had been acquainted with
Franklin for a number of years. Sharing intellectual interests,
they had corresponded on electricity before meeting, and had
5become good friends when Franklin went to England in 1757*
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Fothergill was seeing Dartmouth daily In a medical capacity
and it is not unlikely that his anxiety over the current
state of affairs compelled him to offer his services as an
intermediary, Peeking to find some ground on which the two
6
sides could meet. David Barclay, a friend of Fothergill's, 
was similarly close to Lord Hyde, a minor member of the 
administration similarly disposed to conciliation, and 
together they approached Franklin. Later a further negotia­
tion, this one between Admiral Lord Howe and Franklin took 
place in which Howe broached the idea of the Commission to 
Franklin. Franklin agreed to this, but his terms to Howe 
were not really any different than those he had held out to 
Fothergill and Barclay.
An intermediary was necessary at this point, for while 
Dartmouth and the colonial agent had had several frank dis­
cussions in 1773> Dartmouth and other members of the adminis­
tration had lost faith in him in the wake of the Whately
7
letters episode. Moreover, Franklin had been badly singed
by Wedderburn's personal attack on him during the Privy
Council hearing on the matter. The American and the American
8
Secretary had not seen each other since, although Franklin 
was frequently in company with English radicals such as Mrs. 
MacCauley and the Bishop of St. Asaph, and members of the 
Opposition. This was unfortunate because the breach in their 
thinking had widened, especially in so far as Franklin was 
concerned.
1X3
In any event Franklin gave Barclay and Fothergill some
"Hints for a conversation upon the subject of terms that
may probably p r o d u c e  a durable Union between Great Britain
and her CoXouie*,* which was then passed on to Hyde and 
9Dartmouth* Both read it, for there are notes on the manuscript
10 11 
in both hands* It is probable that North saw it as well*
Dartmouth had expected to give some Inducement towards
conciliation, but Franklinf© proposals were far-reaching
and the concessions that the ministry was prepared to make
were entirely unacceptable to the American* He felt the
12
Hints" had been rejected "in spirit if not in form," and
he was probably correct. For although the mercantile theory
received its ©hare of colonial wrath, the main disagreement
arose over the constitutional issue©* Included in Franklin’s
demand© were: no taxation, no troops without consent of
the assembly, legislative control of the salaries of crown
officials, revocation of the law whereby person© accused of
treason might be transported to England for trial, and
reenactment by the colonial legislature© of the acts of trade
and navigation and the act for establishing the Admiralty
Courts* This, for all practical purposes, amounted to home 
1*3rule* The qualifications imposed on these demand© by the 
ministers clearly demonstrated that they were not willing to 
make such a concession* Their conception of the Empire 
necessitated a sovereign Parliament*
\
Agreement was further complicated hy the fact that,
gave Chatham, no one in England, including Dartmouth, could
think of repealing the Coercive Acta, which had been designed
to secure this essential submission to Parliamentary laws
from the colonists* But, Fothergill wrote Dartmouth, "as
a concession to pay a tax was the sine qua non on this side,
so a rescinding of those Acts, or rather repealing them, is
1 itthe term of reconciliation on the other#"* He continued
that if the offensive acts were repealed "we have not the
least doubt but America would Immediately return to every
15Just expression of duty both in language and conduct#* /
In view of the history of the last decade, Dartmouth and the 
rest of the ministry must have doubted this and their doubt 
certainly colored their reception of the last plan Barclay’s 
optimism conceiveds the agents would petition for repeal, 
promising to pay for the tea, and the acts would be suspended
while commissioners went to America (Howe and Hyde were
% 16 
considered) in lieu of more troops. Franklin accepted this
and Fothergill carried the plan to Dartmouth who regretfully
rejected it. Dartmouth was willing to repeal only one of
the Coercive Acts, the Boston Port Bill. Restitution for the
n It
tea (upon which Franklin staked his personal fortune) 
justified suspension of the Port Bill, for It signified obe­
dience to Parliament, but the other Acts had been for the 
purposes of reformation and in the case of the Quebec Act,
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seemed to Dartmouth to hear no relation to "the present
c o n t e s t . H e r e  the fear of Parliament’s intentions and
power on the part of America, so Incomprehensible to the
American Secretary, becomes significant, Franklin would not
settle for less than total repeal for ”while Parliament
claimed and exercised a power of altering our constitutions
X8
at pleasure,” he wrote, Hhere could he no agreement,” 
fbUB this attempt at negotiation failed also, and, at this 
point it must be apparent that negotiation was really no 
longer possible.
Fothergill, in his letter to Dartmouth had lamented!
Was the whole of Administration as 
cordially disposed to peace and sensible 
of its advantages as Lord Dartmouth,
I think there would be very little 
difficulty in accomplishing It, But X 
see and perceive so strong a current 
another way, that I despair , . , 15
Fothergill was correct in his assessment of Dartmouth’s
concern and certainly other members of the Cabinet were
unwilling to temporize with America at all* But for
Dartmouth, as for them, the essence of the dispute could not
be given up without disaster* He was discouraged that the
talks had produced no results, and exasperatedly asked
Hutchinson if he thought any proposals could be made to
satisfy the Americans* In January DeBerdt had written Heed
of Dartmouth’s assurance to him "that if the Americans expect
that Great Britain will grant all their requisitions, as
contained in the petition of Congress, an accomodation will
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neyer take place*w Ae the Secretary had himself written 
his American correspondentt "You observe that if neither 
Parliament nor America will recede, the most dreadful cause-* 
quencee will ensue* If that were the ease, can any
reasonable man have a doubt which of them should recede, or
■ HI
at whose door the guilt of those consequences would lie? * ■
So Dartmouth, while unwilling to end the hope of a channel 
for conciliation, (for example, he continued to solicit 
letters from Heed after Heed stopped writing in February,
v 22
17T5), ' was likewise unwilling to pay the great price the 
Americans demanded for union*
His pragmatlam and over-optimism in seeking conciliation, 
as well as his differences with other members of the 
Cabinet, are demonstrated in his response to Chatham1a 
^provisional act for settling the troubles in America and 
asserting the supreme legislative authority and superintending 
power of Groat Britain over the c o l o n i e s * Y h l s  omnibus 
included the repeal of all the Coercive Acts and the Quebec 
Act, as well as recognising the Congress and making other 
concessions to colonial home rule, but uaequivocably stated 
the supremacy of parliament* After Its introduction in the 
House of lords, Dartmouth asked for time to consider it and 
suggested it lie on the table* When he sat down, Sandwich, 
one of the hostile Bedfords, denounced the Bill in the strongest 
language, followed by Gower, Hillsborough and even Grafton* 
fhesa members of the administration urged that the colonies
11?
were already in rebellion and must be subdued. When one 
of the opposition, speaking for the bill, commended Dartmouth 
for his "candid proposal" in giving time for consideration, 
Dartmouth, realising that the bill could never pass and that 
he -would be taking sides against his fellow ministers in
2bpublic with nothing to be gained, reversed his position.
Rising, he said that "after hearing so many noble lords speak 
against permitting the bill to lie on the table," he had
changed his mind* Typically, he declined the praise offered
*« 1.2 kfor his candor, since he would now vote to reject the bill*
As Bargar points out, "the real question was whetherto reject
the bill now or later , for he knew it could never be
approved, and it suited his purpose in hoping to find an
accomodation that could be approved, not to alienate the rest
of the Cabinet* Politics, after all, is the art of the
possible.
TEE HOD AID TEE BRAICH
While Dartmouth had been concerning himself with seeking 
some channel of communication, through which he might dis­
cover a common ground with the Americans, others in the 
ministry had been concerned with how to enforce the actions 
Britain had already taken. Gage was criticized for his
"inactivity” and because he reconmienaea repeal of the Coercive
2g
Acts. Pownall had proposed sending Sir Jeffrey Amherst
and two major generals to America# early la the fall and 
this vac considered la apita of reservations from both the
King and Dartmouth that It was harsh to Gage* Amherst*a
.2-6
refusal Jettisoned the plan*' '' Modest steps toward military 
reinforcement had been taken but no general plan was formed# 
probably because of a lack of neve from Gage and hope for 
a sign of reconciliation from the First Continental Congress*
Hutchinson commented many times on the lack of direction and
27
inertia in Aster team affairs# and at least one minister 
blamed it on Dartmoutht "What surprises me#" Rockford wrote
to Sandwich# "is that lord Dartmouth does not come with 
some plan t© the Cabinet * * * X haw* been free ©nought to
pg
tell him to do it*”;
Dartmouth had a plan# but its preemption of force for 
communication and conciliation did not make it popular with 
the rest of the administration* late in 1TT& Horth had 
written his step-brother that he thought it right for 
Dartmouth to bring "the whole of (your) measures soon before 
the Cabinet* where he would "consider (your) reasons
go
dispassionately* * Exactly what these measures were is 
not mentioned# but they probably included Fowaall#s commission 
idee* Apparently Berth already had reservations about them 
for he then remarks on his "wish to see some measure adopted
which may prevent the bad effects which the too great appear*
29ance of lenity and concession may produce."  ^ Hot
1X9
surprisingly the Cabinet failed to adopt Dartmouth * s 
suggestion and in view of his hopes for the unofficial talks 
going on with Franklin, it is doubtful that he was willing 
to put forward detailed military plans in its wake.
He did attempt to give effect to his new faith in the
idea of a firm hand and a velvet glove, however. When the
new Parliament met Pownall and Knox wrote the American clause
30in the King’s speech. It declared that a rebellion was In
progress in Massachusetts Bay, and assured Parliament
that
You may depend upon my firm and steadfast 
resolution to withstand every attempt to 
weaken or Impair the supreme authority of 
this legislature over all the dominions 
of my crown; the maintenance of which I 
consider as essential to the dignity, the 
safety and the welfare of the British 
Empire. 31
But it was temperate as well as firm. As Dartmouth pointed 
out to the House of Lords, it stipulated that the colonies 
"would be tenderly and gently treated" when they returned to 
duty.^ The Cabinet finally reached agreement in meetings
on January 13 stud January 21, upon a three-sided plan to
33translate these words into action.
Immediate steps were taken to reinforms Gages a number 
of regiments including one of cavalry, 600 marines and 10 or 
12 sloops of war were to be sent across the Atlantic. This 
continent was all that could be presently sent, but plans
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*3l|.
were made for more to be raised and dispatched later, which
35Parliament approved in mid~February.
A further "inconvenience" conceived was the bill to
restrain the trade and fishing of the Hew England colonies.
In supporting his plan in Commons North declared "that as the
Americans had refused to trade with this kingdom, it was but
just that we should not suffer them to trade with any other
nation,” and that deprivation of the fisheries was justified
since Massachusetts was in rebellion and the other New
England colonies were aiding and abetting her treason. ^
Since the purpose of thejsaot, like that of the Port Bill, was
to compel obedienbe, the restraints were to be lifted by the
Governor upon his satisfaction that the purposes had been 
3T
achieved. Late in March official correspondence indicated 
that other colonies had become equally refractory and the 
trade ban was extended to all but New York, North Carolina 
and Georgia. Both bills passed with large majorities.
But while the colonies were to be brought back to duty
by force and economic pressure, the ministry, still wanted
to demonstrate its indulgence. Hence at their January 21st
meeting they
agreed that an address be proposed to the 
two Houses of Parliament to declare that 
if the colonies should make sufficient and 
permanent provision for the support of the 
civil government and administration of 
justice and for the defense and protection 
of said colonies, and in time of war 
contribute extraordinary supplies, in a
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reasonable proportion to what is raised 
by Great Britain, we will in that ease 
desist from the exercise of the power of 
taxation except for commercial purposes 
only, and that whenever a proposition of 
this kind shall be made by any of the 
colonies we will enter into the considera­
tion of proper law© for that purpose, and 
in the meanwhile to entreat his Majesty 
to take the most effectual method© to 
enforce due obedience to the law© and 
authority of the supreme legislature of 
Great Britain* 38
A® has been seen the view that taxation might be given up
In practice while not in principle had been held by Dartmouth
for several years, was shared by FownalX and Knox, and even
Suffolk told Hutchinson that "he owned he looked upon an
«19attempt to enforce Internal taxation as desperate*” While 
the ministry was not willing to give up this right of taxa­
tion then, they were willing to give up the exercise of it 
if the colonies would solve the practical problem of finding 
Yiateel&l support for themselves. The greatest opposition 
to it, a© Dartmouth told Hutchinson, was that it might 
"encourage Ctbe colonlesj in their claim, of independency by
concession, of which they had always been ready to taka 
#tk0
advantage* It 1© interesting that it was not brought 
into Parliament for a month after the Cabinet agreed on it 
and that it followed the Bestralnt of Trade Bill and the 
augmentation of military forces by nearly two weeks# Several 
explanation© might be plausible*
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First, the negotiations with Franklin did not reach 
their unsuccessful conclusion until February 15 of 16. It 
was the nineteenth when North wrote the King that the Cabinet 
had decided upon the Proposition Thursday the sixteenth, and 
it was presented to Parliament on the twentieth.
Secondly, north’s motives in presenting it have been
questioned. It was widely believed that not all the colonies
were as radical as Massachusetts, though her leadership had
created a surprising unanimity. It was thought that a
concession might disrupt this unity by causing some of the
moderate coloaies-~highest hopes were held out for New Xork--
to accept the terms of the proposition and thus serve as a
damper to the fires of rebellion. Less conciliatory was
another motive ascribed to North for bringing the motion,
as demonstrated in a letter to the King:
c o  have reason to think it would give 
satisfaction here and . . . that it will 
greatly facilitate the passing of the 
Bill now in the House for restraining the 
trade of New England, and the other which 
must, do fear soon be brought in for 
subjecting Virginia, Maryland and other 
provinces to the same restrictions. ^1
While the "indulgence" 6f his proposition may have 
"facilitated" passage, it is very unlikely that North would not 
have succeeded in the Restraining Act, for as the King had 
written him a few days earlier: "The concurrence of the
majority of the House of Commons In the measures to be 
pursued in New England was evident in the good humour of
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receiving the motion for temporarily restraining the trade
42
and fishing at so late an hoar as six*IT
Finally, while Dartmouth clearly wanted to "hold some­
thing out to the colonies," he was not entirely happy with
the Conciliatory Proposition* I'd Etchinson "he seemed appre-
43
henslve of the ill-effect it might have as it now stands."
Was this because he knew how far the Proposition was from 
meeting American demands, as he had seen them in Franklin*s 
"Hints"? Or because he himself was willing to go so much 
further towards finding a common ground, than the others in 
the Cabinet? Or was it because he was still disappointed 
that the commission idea had been dropped? All three are 
probable, if not provable, together, Dartmouth and the
Governor agreed on alterations, some of which the Earl had
4-s
proposed in the Cabinet.  ^ Dartmouth then hesitated in 
regard to the dispatches which were to accompany news of the 
proposition to the governors* Hutchinson learned, albeit 
third hand, that Horth had written them and had some diffi­
culty in bringing Dartmouth to consent to them, although
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he does not say why. In the end, he supported the 
Proposition as the best that could be obtained, and he held 
out great hopes for it, since his other attempts at coneilid-
4*5
tion had failed.
His preference for personal negotiations and his laclc 
of faith in the popular assemblies are demonstrated in the
private letter sent to the governors along with the dispatch 
containing the proposition. "For very obvious reasons," 
he wrote, the governor was not officially to communicate 
the dispatch to the assemblies! rather he was to give "a 
proper explanation of it to those whose situation and connex­
ions £sic3 may enable them to give facility to the measures 
„46it points to* In another private letter accompanying the
dispatch he wrote that:
There neither can nor will be the least 
relaxation from those measures which fthe 
Americans *3 conduct has made necessary 
for reducing the colonies to a state of 
due obedience to the constitution authority 
of Parliament. 47
4
This was, he assured them "the general sense of the nation."
Dartmouth fervently hoped that once the colonists 
really understood Parliament's intention to be firm and ap­
preciated the good intentions behind this firmness that 
they must come round to a rightful idea of the constitution 
and their blessings under it. For this reason, he was 
unswayed by Governor Tryon who had written him in January 
that he could not "agree with [your} Lordship's idea of 
holding out the olive branch in one hand and the rod of
K 7
chastisement in the other. Tryon advised either the
removal of the stumbling blocks or rigorous measures. Dart-
49mouth was against repealing the Coercive Acts and yet 
coercion had not been successful by itselfj if the colonists 
feared Parliamentary intentions as they seemed to, perhaps
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some indication of its benevolence, coupled with its 
determination, would help to restore harmony. These hopes 
remained alive until after the Second Continental Congress 
had completely rejected the Proposition and the outbreak of 
civil war illustrated the lengths to which the colonists 
were willing to go to end "inconveniences” by force rather 
than submission to a sovereign Parliament. They must have
50been fragile hopes, for Hutchinson described a very dispirited"^ 
Dartmouth through the winter of 1775> but they sustained 
him though the disappointing news of the next months.
AH ACTIVE AHD DETERMINED PART
In November Knox had told Hutchinson that he would
welcome hostilities: "We shall then, be at no loss how to
51proceed." In March, the governor had seen Dartmouth "who 
seems very apprehensive that the Hew England people will
resist the King* s troops and does not know but what some
52
action between them will be best." Perhaps Dartmouth 
hoped to forcibly subdue the most refractions colonies as 
a means of leading the others back to loyalty.
The American Secretary believed that the sovereignty of 
Parliament must be upheld and he participated In the January 
Cabinet decisions specifying that force would be used to se> 
cure that end, if necessary. Consequently, on January 27,
1775, he wrote Cage reflecting the opinion prevailing in
12 6
the ministry that the General should take a less passive 
stance?
Your dispatches . * . state proceedings 
that amount to actual revolt, and shew a 
determination in the people to commit 
themselves at all events in open rebellion.
The King*s dignity, honor and the safety 
of the Empire, require that, in such a 
situation, force should be repelled by 
force « . •
More troops were to be sent, the letter continued, and the
Governor-General should seek to raise additional infantry
from the loyalists.
It appears that your object has hitherto 
been to act on the defensive . . . .  It 
is hoped, however, that this large 
reinforcement will enable you to take a 
more active and determined part . . . .
There is a strong appearance that the body 
of the people in at least three of the 
Hew England governments are determined to 
cast off their dependence upon the govern­
ment of this Kingdom] the only considera­
tion that remains is in what manner the 
force under your command may be exerted to 
defend the constitution . . .  53
Dartmouth continued to emphasise that the disobedience was 
"merely the acts of a tumultuous rabble, without any appear­
ance of general concert," in spite of Gage *s recent letters, 
and urged him to "imprison the principal actors" in a surprise 
move that would prevent bloodshed. But commerce must be 
protected from the association, even if that meant the people 
would take up arms. Finally he urged him to "recover into 
the King*s possession" the military stores collected by the
12?
colonists and dismantle fortifications at Hewport and Hew 
Iondon.
While such a letter obviously does not exhibit Dartmouth's 
total policy towards America, and while it represents the 
thinking of the Cabinet on being firm towards the rebellion, 
we can safely assume that a man of Dartmouth's conscience 
would not have signed it without approving of what it said.
Gage received the letter on the sixteenth of April and on 
the nineteenth sent a detachment on the ill-fated mission to 
Lexington and Concord. Actually some plan of thi£ kind 
had been in Gage's mind before he received the January 2?th 
instructions] the dispatch simply confirmed his own anticipated 
course of action.
It should, however, have prepared Dartmouth for the 
May 28th arrival of a Captain Darby, employed to bring news 
of the first battle as written by the Provincial Congress by 
a fast ship from Salem, This version arrived a full twelve 
days before Gage's official dispatch, which only added to 
the uneasiness of the whole situation.
5 k
Dartmouth was "much struck with it" and "too • . .
55affected by the account to say much." In hie distress
he "hinted" to Hutchinson "at the puzzle the opposition
would be In, if Administration should leave the reins to 
5 6them." Despite the January dispatch, he apparently blamed
55"the King's officers" and perhaps his greatest disappoint­
ment was that dispatches from other colonies indicated that
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news of the encounter was ruining any good effects of the
Conciliatory Proposition -which had arrived in American
57shortly after the battle. Typically, however, he continued
57to have a favorable outlook upon the proposition and at 
the same time wrote Gage that the outbreak of hostilities had 
"had no other effect here than to raise that just indigna­
tion which every honest man must feel at the rebellious con-
,,58
duct of the New England colonies. The real issue was
still Parliamentary sovereignty and Dartmouth continued
to believe it his duty to support it, even if this required
military action. Not only must the rebellion be subdued,
but the friends of government must be protected from the
59increasingly vicious attacks of the "patriots". He gave 
up hopes of conciliating New England: she must be conquered.
But there was still some chance that the colonies to the 
southward could be returned to duty by application of enough 
force to bring the moderates to power. He failed to 
appreciate the truth in what Lieutenant-Governor Bull had 
written him from South Carolina in February: "Boston (is)
60the North Star by which our political courses are shaped."
While he wrote Dunmore that ”the madness of the people of
Virginia . . . leaves no room for any other consideration
than that of suppressing . . . rebellion," and Wentworth
that "almost every . . . colony has catehed the flame and . .
,,62
a spirit of rebellion has gone forth; he wrote Campbell
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that "there is still some room to hope that the colonies to 
the Southward may not proceed to the same lengths as those
,,63of New England* In these separate letters he advised each
governor that "the proper measures are now pursuing , . .
for augmenting the Army and (adding} to our naval strength.
To Dunmore and Martin however, he sent an additional note 
urging them to encourage association in the western counties 
of North Carolina against the rebels, and the raising of a
65 .loyalist battalion of Highlanders. Something of Knox's
belief that once the Americans had tasted what the rebels
had to offer they would gladly accept the supervision of
Parliament shows in his letter to Dunmore:
Support of Council on May 2 . . . affords
good ground to hope, that men of spirit
and property will at l&ngth be awakened
to a sense of their situation and the 
inevitable ruin which must follow from such 
a state of total anarchy and confusion as 
your Lordship represents the colony to be 
in. 65
If Dartmouth still had hopes of reconciliation, the rest
of the Cabinet was more concerned with the pursuit of
"vigorous measures." In a conversation with Hutchinson,
Hillsborough claimed that "Lord Suffolk, Lord Rochford,
Gower, Sandwich, and the Chancellor, with Lord North, were
66all of one mind . . . that Lord Dartmouth was alone." This
cryptic comment apparently puzzled Hutchinson, for he added,
after writing it in his diary, "perhaps he meant, not equally 
66engaged." Certainly Dartmouth did not oppose the military 
steps he described as necessary and Just in his letters to
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the governors, if he did still hope for a short and narrow
span of hostilities. The cabinet met on June 15 and 21 to
plan the increase in forces froip Great Britain, Ireland and
Canada, with regiments from Gibraltar and Minorca to join those
raised from Scotland in America.^ And clearly, if, as
Pownall put it, the Cabinet had to choose between "leaving
the colonies independent or acting more vigorously in
68
reducing them to government," Dartmouth's preference would
have been the same as his colleagues.
The King, as seen above, was of a similar mind. He
was undisturbed by even Captain Darby's partial account of
Lexington and Concord as he had expected "blows" to decide
69the question of independence or submission for some time.
He played an active part in making plans to augment army
TOand naval forces in the colonies. His determination was
revealed in a letter to North:
I am clear as to one point, that we must 
persist and not be dismayed by any 
difficulties that may arise on either
side of the Atlantic; I know I am doing
my duty and therefore can never wish to
retract. 71
Even with the outbreak of war, however, there was
optimism. As North expressed it,
Our wish is not to impose on our fellow 
subjects in America any terms inconsistent 
with the most perfect liberty. I cannot 
help thinking that many of the principal 
persons in North America will, in the 
calmness of the winter, be disposed to bring
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forward a reconciliation, Now they are
too angry, too suspicious, too much under
the guidance of factious leaders • • • J2
Dartmouth was similarly inclined to look on the bright side
at this point. He wrote to Knox who was at Spa, a letter
touching in its warmth and futile hope:
Your confident ce) of success has sometimes 
kept up my spirits when they were beginning 
to einkj let me now prevail upon you to 
believe that all will yet do well, notwith­
standing the gloom that covers the horizon.
The fate of empires often depends upon 
events that are little foreseen until the 
moment of their appearance. 73
With no real evidence of a happy ending, the American
Secretary was forced to look to what had not yet occurred
for a solution. He was still in this mood a month later
when he wrote to Knox from Sandwell, that
I rather wish than expect a settlement of 
our differences upon the ground of the terms 
stated in the article from Philadelphia.
However, I see no reason why we may not now 
set our feet upon that or any ground that 
can be given and though both sides will have 
a great way to go before they will be within 
the sound of each others voice, it is not 
impossible that they may come near enough 
to shake hands at last.” 7^
Dartmouth put his own terms at the end of the letter:
Parliament would regulate trade and the colonies would provide
"revenue for the support of civil government, and such
military force as they . . . desire." It ie on these terras
of the Conciliatory Proposition that Dartmouth still hoped
for agreement! "God send that day as soon as it may be,"
he finished, but this prayer could not be answered, for the
Americans would never again settle for those terms.
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OUT OF THE SOUHD OF EACH OTHER * S VOICES
The spring and summer of 1775 witnessed more than the 
outbreak of civil war and extensive military preparations 
on both sides of the Atlantic# The Americans mad© two last 
attempts at conciliating their differences with the mother 
country; their failure represents just how far apart the two 
parties to the dispute were, and the end of any moderate 
Influences in the colonies#
As noted above, Hew York had long been regarded as the
most loyal of colonies. There are more items relating to
Hew York remaining in Dartmouth* s papers (as calendared by
the Historical Manuscripts Commission) than any other colony
except the problem child of Massachusetts, doubtless for
this reason. lew York had no official delegation at the
First Continental Congress and the Hew York Assembly
“disapproved and rejected*' the measures of that body “in one 
„T5grand blow* The Restraining Act was not applied to Hew
York, and more than any other colony It was expected that 
Hew York would accept the Conciliatory Proposition. But the 
Idleness of such expectations became apparent when the King 
received a conciliatory petition from the Assembly stating 
the necessity for “such a system of government . . .  as will 
ascertain and limit the authority of the British legislature.1 ^  
Obviously with the King determined to support the sovereignty
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of Parliament as the essence of the constitution which 
brought peace and harmony to the Empire, such a petition 
t o , not acceptable* Both houses of Parliament likewise 
declined even to hear the petitions addressed to them read, 
on the grounds that they denied the right of Parliament to 
tax the colonies in all cases whatsoever. As Bargar points 
out, it was '"unreal!stic for the two house© of Parliament * . 
to stand on their dignity . * * when the supremacy they 
claimed was rapidly vanishing in a revolutionary war*"^7 
Yet they were unable to see any alternative. Conformable 
to hie desire to open channels of communication, Dartmouth 
favored receiving the remonstrance, though he could not 
agree to it, and North was "rather inclined;" but they were
78
alone in this preference. The Secretary*© own lack of 
realism is evident in his letter to Tryon explaining the re­
jection of the petitions, for he expressed confidence "that 
the resolution of the House of Commons of the 27th Febfruarjy
will remove all obstacles to the restoration of public 
.*79tranquillity*  ^ Surely this can only be described as 
grasping at straws; Dartmouth must have reallad how far even 
Hew York was from accepting the Conciliatory Proposition when 
he read their Remonstrances. This is especially true since 
Dartmouth had been Informed by the time he wrote his letter 
of New York*© progress toward© the same extra-legal actions 
her northern brethren were taking*
13k
•1?
If American moderates vere disheartened by the reception, or 
lack of it, of New York’s gesture, they vere totally dis­
illusioned toy the treatment accorded the Olive Branch 
petition to the King of the Second Continental Congress. 
Dartmouth, as seen in his letter to Knox above, had hopes for 
this petition and took pains to ensure that a proclamation, 
putting into effect a resolution of the House of Commons
declaring some of the colonies in a state of rebellion, vas
8l
postponed until after lie delivery. These efforts vere
only partially successful, since an unofficial copy of the
petition reached the American office before the Privy Council
approved the Proclamation on August 2k, 1?75> hut Dartmouth
did not receive it in person until September 1.
Bargar speculates on Dartmouth’s state of mind as he
received Richard Penn and Arthur Lee, special delegates from
the Congress, vith their petition. Certainly he must have
had mixed feelings. On the one hand David Barclay had told
him that this vae a sincere attempt at reconcillation, the
rejection of which would completely undermine the position
82
of moderates in America. On the other was the urgent belief 
of another old friend that to treat "with rebels, while they
have arms in their hands,” would demonstrate a fatal
83weakness. J In the end Dartmouth’s action was probably 
dictated by his own conception of what the petition said.
After accepting the petition Dartmouth shoved it to the 
King and then declined to make any comment on it saying
135
"that as hie Majesty did not receive It on the throne,
m
no answer would he given. * Dartmouth took this approach
■since it was apparent to hi® that no accomodation could
he reached on the basis of the petitloot the colonists in
addressing themselves to the crown above Parliament were,
In effect, repealing the Glorious Revolution. When a motion
was made in the House of Lords the following November that
the petition afforded ground© for reconciliation, Dartmouth
defended its rejection# To accept it, the product of
Congress, would be to reliatulsh the sovereignty of Parlia*
meat. Furthermore, some of John Adams* intercepted letters
had convinced the ministry that independence wa© the real
aim of the Americans} hence Dartmouth claimed that, "the
petition, in terms, was unexceptionable, but there was
rea&m to believe that the softness of language was purposely
.,85
adopted to conceal the most traitorous designs#”
Dartmouth was a moderate} the petition had been framed 
by American moderatesi and yet eo far as had the two sides 
to the dispute travelled by the fall of 1775, that even the 
moderate© were out of the sound of each others* voices.
CHAPTER V
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CHAPTER VI 
A RELEASE FROM FATIGUE
fO ESTABLISH AH IHDEPBHDENCX
The year 1775 'was a disillusioning one for Dartmouth.
In February he had written Gage that
I am convinced that whilst Great Britain 
continues firm, tempering at the same 
time her firmness with such indulgence to 
Any reasonable proposition that shall be 
offered by the colonies in respect to 
taxation,as shall consist with justice to 
them and a resolute attachment to the 
principles of the Constitution anarfcy, 
confusion & disobedience must give way to 
peace and good government. 1
In July he could ’’still entertain a hope . . . that when
the middle colonies have recovered from the prejudices . . .
created by . « * artful misrepresentations of the affair of
, . * the 19th of April, they will be induced to take up
the # * . Resolution of the 20th of Febr{[uar)y . . .  1
There was loss of faith behind this hope, however, as Dartmouth
revealed in the next paragraph:
At the same time we must not trust tb 
appearances . . . the conduct of the people 
of Connecticut, who, in the moment of their 
preparing for an expedition against 
Ticonderoga had the affectation to propose 
to you a suspension of hostilities, is an 
instance of such consummate duplicity, as 




Dartmouth was becoming discouraged, and the dispatches 
from America only added to his pessimism by demonstrating 
the total failure of his policies, Lieutenant Governor Bull 
wrote that the conciliatory proposition "seems rather to 
alarm them and to raise their jealousies than to in. * Invite 
them to a separate application, and will , , . strengthen 
their unanimity," If indulgence had not been effective, 
neither had firmness, for Wentworth advised him that "diffi­
culties increase here every day, more especially sinee the 
Hestaining Bill took place, There was no longer any doubt,
Campbell wrote, that the rebels were planning "to establish
5an independency,” and "scarce a shadow of authority (wasj
6left" to government, Gage informed him that nearly every 
colony had "overthrown its government and . . , lodged , , . 
all power in Congress and committees,” Perhaps most dis­
turbing to the Secretary was the termination of that
affection and reverence for the mother country that Reed had
8spoken glowingly of as late as February. As Wentworth
described iti
In that early stage of the opposition ♦ , . 
the people condemned the insult and attack 
on his Majesty1s fort and violation of his 
property, which now, that violence hath 
got such a head as to bring on a civil war, 
they applaud and commend as highly meri­
torious, 9
If the lari's official correspondence was disconcerting, 
the intercepted private letters that came to his attention 
were even more so. Here he learned that "a motion has been
1*5
made at the Continental Congress for an independency,,,i0
and that if England "thought Congress would Insist on nothing
but no taxation" they were solely mistaken. This was “not
so since blood (had been] spilled." The writer, in this
ease none other than Thomas Jefferson, continued:
I wish no false sense of honor, no ignorance 
of our real intentions, no vain hope that 
partial concessions of right will be accepted 
may induce the ministry to trifle with 
accommodation til it shall be put even out 
of our own power ever to accommodate. 11
By the end of the summer of 1775 it was clear from all
accounts that civil government in America had been almost
totally usurped, most governors having had to flee to the
safety of naval vessels or British forts, and that civil
12war was being vigorously waged by both sides. Moreover, 
colonial demands had risen beyond the possibility of ful­
fillment by the ministry then in power, including the good 
Lord Dartmouth.
The only option for the ministry, given its interpre­
tation of the constitution, was to militarily reduce the 
colonies to submission. The Proclamation of Rebellion 
issued August 2* gave notice to America and the world that 
this was exactly what Britain intended to do. While the 
colonial Secretary was more willing to temporize with 
America than the King and the rest of the cabinet, he too, 
was unwilling to accept the alternative to war; a dimunition 
in Parliaments ability to supervise the colonies. ~
Ik6
Like hi© colleague© mud all Englishmen, he was unable to 
perceive the impracticability of insisting on the maintenance 
of a right that no longer existed. The Conciliatory Propo* 
sltioa had been vehemently rejected* not only by each indivi~ 
dual colony, but by the Second Continental Congress* Yet 
la it© address to the King* tie House of Common© reiterated 
the same plan. "When the colonise ©hall have made sufficient 
provision for the support of their respective civil 
governments * # . %  they---advised, it would no longer be 
necessary for Parliament to raise a revenue in America. But 
Parliament could *fnever so far desert the trust reposed in 
them a© to relinquish any part of the sovereign authority 
over all his Majesty*© dominions* nor allow that any of 
them ought to be exempted from the common burden necessary 
to the Whole."12
The administration* accordingly, had thrown itself 
wholeheartedly into preparation for carrying out its military 
p o l i c y * The only ray of light for Dartmouth at this 
point was the loyalty of the western counties of Morth 
Carolina of which Martin had written so confidently! 
consequently hie major contribution to the war effort© in 
the making was to insure that an expedition to the southern 
colonies would be dispatched before winter. Even this hope 
wae dim* however, for he wrote Martini
In such a situation I must confess to you
that 1 think you are too ©anguine in your
Ib7
expectation of being able, if properly 
supported, in the manner you suggest, to 
induce a large part of the inhabitants 
of North Carolina to take up arms in 
support of Government, l^f
Arms, and later an expedition were sent, the dispatches
concerning them being the last Dartmouth wrote before leaving
office.15
This sort of business however, was not at all to Dart­
mouth 1s liking. It was normal for him to spend several 
weeks la Staffordehire in August and early September, but in 
1775 his absence continued until much later in to the fall*
While he returned to town for brief periods, he left the
16disagreeable direction of military matters to Pownall.
Naturally with the Secretary absent some^of the old quarrels
over the status of the American department flared open and
Pownall wrote exaggeratedly to Knox that,
As to measures for America, I know 
nothing about them, for since I have 
been deserted by our principal, that 
business is got into other hands and 
my friend Eden knows a great deal 
more . . , than your faithful servant.17
Perhaps such friction was part of Dartmouth*© determination
to stay away but unpleasantness did not emanate from the
Northern Department alone. Secretary at War Barrington wrote
Dartmouth to disagree with his plans for supporting Martin
and Campbell and rather petulantly reminded him "of the
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necessity for consulting able military men before taking
„l8Steps in military matters.
While such criticism increased the onerousness of 
Dartmouth's already unpalatable employment, he could not 
resign for two reasons. First, he was in substantial agree- 
ment with the cabinet’s policy even if he disliked imple­
menting it. Secondly, he remained, as in 1712,North's only 
ally in an otherwise hostile cabinet. To desert his step 
brother in a time of crisis would leave him politically 
vulnerable, especially in view of the defection of another 
member of the administration, the Duke of Grafton.
AH HOBOBABLE BETBEAT
It was Grafton’s defection, however, that ultimately 
provided for Dartmouth’s escape and bolstered Worth’s 
position by appeasing the Bedfords and Suffolk with the 
addition of lord George Germain to the cabinet.
The Duke of Grafton, Lord Privy Seal, had fallen out 
with Horth’e ministry over its refusal to repeal the tea 
duty, and had not attended a cabinet meeting since 17?0 »
The Olive Branch precipitated his final breaks he wrote the 
Prime Minister of his plan for Parliament to receive the 
petition and ask the King to offer suspension of hostilities 
If the colonies would depute persons to England to negotiate
19
with the mother country* Grafton waited seven weeks before
20
north replied in the negativej by this- time Parliament was 
in session and the Privy Seal was speaking out in Lords against 
his own administration* Suspicions that he would not he 
part of that administration for long were widespread, as were 
rumors of what would become of his office* "They talk of 
Lord Dartmouth for the Privy Seal if the Duke of Grafton 
goes out , « * hut it is a moot question If Orafton will he * . 
without a salary*"^ Perhaps it was his reputed avarice 
that made Orafton delay hi© resignation in spite of the 
embarrassment he caused the ministry! finally, the King wrote 
lorth that his Seale would be sent for if he did not bring 
them himself*
Dartmouth too, knew of Grafton*a impending retirement,
and asked to have Grafton*® office when he left it* As
Grafton*s successor had been apparent to those observing
British politics in 1775, so was Dartmouth*ss
Lord George Germain is talked of to succeed 
Lord Dartmouth who is to be Privy Seal*
1 wish the talk may be confirmed, because 
our friend Lord Dartmouth will have repose, 
and an honorable retreat, & Lord George 
Germain will have a very distinguished com** 
plement to his abilities, and both will 
be well provided for, & I should think to 
both their satisfactions. 23
Lord George Germain presents a great contrast to the 
pious Lord Dartmouth** Politically, Germain had been a 
Grenvillite when Dartmouth was serving at the Board of Trade
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in Boekingham*s ministry, and later supported the Towoshend
2b
Duties and vigorous measures to enforce them* The contrast 
was also personal. Germain was typically military*'
aggressive, vehement, dogmatlc***and an adroit politician
25
as well# His career had supposedly been eclipsed in 
the late fifties by a eourt~msrtial for cowardice after 
which he was designated as unfit ever to serve his Majesty 
again, and yet he bad worked his way back into royal and 
ministerial graces in ©lightly more than ten years. He had 
spoken energetically and often la favor of the Coercive 
Acts in Common© and made a favorable impression on Lord
26
Borth who was in need of oratorical support in that house*
An 1TT5 brought the outbreak of hostilities he played a
larger role in the thinking of the ministry; Suffolk, in
particular, wrote to him on American affairs and obtained
his ideas on political and military matters* Suffolk1®
Dndersecretary Idea sent him frequent and detailed letters
27to keep him informed. In early October of 17T5 he wrote
**at the special request of Lord north,1* outlining plans
and including a draft of the King* s speech and saying, ”1
shall proceed to tell yon without form or flattery that Lord
2$
Horth * * * thinks you the fittest man in the kingdom.**
So Germain was being consulted on matters within 
Dartmouth*© authority weeks before Dartmouth went out of 
office# That he had little use for the amiable Earl is
evident from a letter shown Hutchinson in which Germain said
that the ministry would not fall after Lexington and Concord
,29
though "Lord Dartmouth, in a fright, may go out* ' He 
thought it improbable that Dartmouth would "give the necessary
30
orders for decisive and vigorous measures." Such a persona­
lity and^such political ideas could not fall to be appealing 
31to the King, determined as he was to cn^i the rebellion)
and Horth would have been eager to have had an able advocate
in Commons during a session when he feared a strong attach
on government*
Dartmouth, who had never wanted to enter office in the
first place, was discouraged by the events of late 1775 and
eager for a refuge consonant with his own integrity and the
honor of Lord Horth. He was willing to lose j£2000 annually
33in salary in order to change his office. But while his
quest of the Privy Seal was self-initiated, it was not
unwelcome to the King and cabinet.
It is an over-simplification to see Dartmouth's exit
and Germain's entrance as a change of policy on the part of
the ministry) Dartmouth believed the waging of war against
the rebellion was necessary, as his speeches in the House
of Lords after he became Privy Seal demonstrate. In November,
1775, he defended rejection of the Olive Branch, and in
March, 1776, he opposed Grafton's conciliation proposal at
length, declaring that the only remedy to the current diffl-
3^
culties was an overpowering force. There was, however,
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a difference in the two men and Germain's accession does 
signify a change in tone at least. He reversed several of 
Dartmouth's military policies immediately.^ The contrast 
between the two is further seen in their approach to the 
Peace Commission of 1776 in which Germain demanded a recog­
nition of Parliamentary supremacy as a sine qua none for 
the negotiations, which Dartmouth opposed from sure Knowledge 
that such a stipulation would doom the talks before they got 
steated, The then Privy Seal felt strongly enough about 
this to threaten resignation, as did Germain, until a com­
promise was worked out.
Some of the confusion over the meaning of this change 
of office can be traced to quite uncharacteristic behavior 
on the part of the Earl of Dartmouth, Though all seemed 
to desire the changes, there was a fly in the ointment:
Lord Weymouth, who had not only a prior claim to the office 
Grafton was vacating but some powerful friends in the Duke 
of Bedford and his followers in the cabinet, Sandwich and 
Gower. In spite of this claim, Dartmouth refused to accept 
any other office than the Privy Seal, The King at first 
urged him to become Groom of the Stole, which was an honorary 
post, but, Dartmouth apparently felt, did not carry enough 
weight for him adequately to support North. Later North 
arranged for Rochford to retire that his step brother might 
have the Southern Department, but this office carried too 
much of the business from which Dartmouth desired to escape.
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As he wrote John Bob inarms "If I take the Seals that are 
offered me X shall reader myself tea. times more miserahle 
than X a m * T h e  anguish of his situation Is quite appa- 
rents
The dread of a situation in which 1 see 
no satisfaction to myself on one hand* 
and ay love for lord Horth and regard to 
his peace of mind on the other tear me 
to pieces* 1 would with all my heart go 
quite out of employment, hut that would 
look unkind to him * * * 11 36
lord Horth threatened to resign if Dartmouth did and his
situation was rendered even more embarrassing since he had 
ventured to negotiate with Germain about the American 
Department before Dartmouth reefgnedj when Dartmouth was 
told the Privy Seal was unavailable he ©aid he would remain 
in his present position. Clearly Iforth had to find a place 
to his step brother*© liking in order to extricate himself 
from hie predicament, which was further complicated by 
Weymouth*© threat to resign if he did not get the Privy Seal, 
which as the king ©aid, would certainly make hie friends un­
happy. Horth thought he had come up with an excellent solu*
tion when he wrote the King asking him to provide a j£2500 
pension for Lord Bochford who was fortunately In ill health,
which would open up one of the older secretaryships for
31either Weymouth or Dartmouth. The king, piqued at Dartmouth
for not Mpermit(ting) his amiable temper to examine the
38
state of affaire coolly” and end the crisis, agreed to the:
pension plan "though my finances are in a very disgraceful 
s i t u a t i o n . S i n c e  Dartmouth would not accept the 
Secretary*s Seals, Weymouth was finally persuaded to do so 
and the way was at last cleared for Dartmouth to become 
Lord Privy Seal and Germain to become American Secretary.
The Seals of each were received on November 10, 1775• On 
November 28, Hutchinson visited Dartmouth, f,who I found 
reading my History and more cheerful than at any time of late,
CONCLUSIONS
Dartmouth*s role in the unhappy events leading up to 
the loss of the first British Empire has been obscured and 
distorted by partisan and superficial descriptions of secon­
dary authors. As a former "old Whig" he is treated favorably 
by George Otto Trevelyans "if Dartmouth could have ruled 
the colonies according to the dictates of his own judgment
and conscience « , . independence would have been postponed
hi
until he ceased to be secretary of state," When he is
not praised for differing with the rest of North's ministry,
he is damned for being too weals: to overcome their dlslifce
of his policies. Benjamin Labaree, somewhat more sympathetic
than others, nevertheless believed "a more determined states-
k2
man could have succeeded." Ritcheson calls him amiable, 
pious and commonplace" and says his colleagues treated him
155
"aB a veil-meaning non-entity and sought to engross American
business all they could# 1*^ 3 Lewis Einstein claims that he
was regarded as "boringly over-sanctimonious*’ and ascribes
his failure to "the cynical political atmosphere of that
a g e # l i k e  Labaree, Fothergill’s biographer, H. H* Fox,
faults the Earl for having "no firmness of character."
John Alden dwells not on his weakness, but criticizes his
attempts at conciliation as "half-hearted.When Dartmouth’s
attachment to the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty is
adequately appreciated, he is held to account for not having
developed the concept of dominion status to satisfy home
rule and the imperial superiority of the mother country, a
concept that was not feasible for several more decades and until
numerous changes in the internal constitution of Great Britain
had taken place#
Part of the difficulty these authors faced can be traced
to their sources# There are conflicting pictures drawn of
Dartmouth, as of any figure in a place of public importance
by hie contemporaries. During the debate on the Coercive
Acts, Attorney-General Thurlou claimed that the ministry was
pursuing coercion with
Lord Dartmouth, who was then American 
Secretary, taking the lead, to exeulpatb 
himself for having formerly moved the 
repeal of the Stamp Act in the Lords. 48
William Lee1s description of the American Secretary * s motives
during this debate is quite different?
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Lord North, Dartmouth and, some say, Lord 
Mansfield, have been against these measures; 
but the Jc£ing3 with his usual obstinacy and 
tyrfanaica^l disposition, is determined . . . 
to enslave you; the Bedford Party, Lord 
Temple and the remnant of the Grenville Party,
Lords Suffolk and Wedderburn, wished the same 
as well as to make their court to the King, 
so that Lords North and Dartmouth have been 
overruled in the Cabinet*" kj
This was the same Mansfield Pownall blamed for the Massachu­
setts Government Act. The Americans could not even agree 
amongst themselves as to how to assess Dartmouth. While 
Benjamin Franklin wrote, "He is truly a good man and wishes 
sincerely a good understanding with the colonies, but does 
not seem to have strength equal to his w i s h e s , A r t h u r
Lee sneered "I am apt to think he will not attempt any thing
50in our favor that will hazard his place.’1
Many of these primary accounts can be disregarded as
obviously prejudiced; others present a more difficult
interpretive problem. Shelburne wrote Chatham, again during
the debates on the Coercive Acts;
I accidentally met Lord Dartmouth 
yesterday . * . without entering into 
the particular measures in question, 
he stated with great fairness, and with 
very little reserve, the difficulties 
of his situation, the unalterableness 
of his principles, and his determination 
to cover America from the present storm, 
even to repealing the Tea Act. 51
At first glance, I this letter seems to indicate that
Dartmouth was opposed to the steps in process by the ministry
and most authors who have quoted Shelburne have stressed
(T 2
the "to cover America.’’^ part of a very full sentence. It
15?
is as important to notice his attachment to his political 
principles, which are well-known to us from his letters 
to Reed and Cushing. These principles called for coercion, 
hence my reading that Dartmouth’s was a pragmatic approach.
Bradley Bargar * s book length study naturally does more 
Justice to the complexities of Dartmouth's role as American 
Secretary than the dime store analysis of a generalized 
narrative. He rightly points out that Dartmouth's reputa­
tion as a friend to America was inflated; the subsequent 
deflation of the bubble of optimism after his acceptance of 
the Secretary’s Seals is doubtless what originated much of 
the misunderstanding about him. Bargar emphasizes the Earl’s 
belief in Parliamentary sovereignty, his natural kindliness 
and.piety and his naivete in expecting his policies to be 
effective. He comprehends the obstacles Dartmouth faced in 
trying to effect conciliation from an office that was not 
designed to plan policy and in a Cabinet where he could not 
create turmoil for fear of undermining his step brother's 
position.
On the other hand there are some distinctions the present 
study makes. Bargar does not present Dartmouth’s desire 
for negotiation, especially through a commission, as forcefully 
as I believe Dartmouth felt it. He makes what was sometimes 
careful diplomacy on the Secretary’s part an act of mere 
courtesy. The consistency of Dartmouth's support of coercive
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and conciliatory policies simultaneously is not fully demon­
strated. Finally, Dartmouth is criticized for favoring the 
information in his official dispatches over that from perhaps 
less biassed sources, such as Reed. But no one in Georgian 
England could have been freed from their misconceptions of 
the situation. Franklin and Hutchinson demonstrate the 
universality of this failing, as Franklin confidently wrote 
to America many times that the ministry must surely fall and 
that unanimity would produce results; Hutchinson just as 
confidently told the ministry that the colonists would never 
unite.
Dartmouth believed Parliament sovereign but he believed 
that its sovereignty could be maintained in name only, 
without a tax to demonstrate it. This sovereignty could even 
be denied by Americans, as long as it was a denial in words 
and not in deeds. Once the latter occurred he maintained 
that the denial must be revoked or the colonies would be­
come independent, an evil second only to the derogation of 
Parliamentary authority. At the same time he realized that 
extreme measures would only create extreme responses. Bo 
while he adhered to a policy of coercing Massachusetts into 
obeying the laws of Parliament, he hoped not to offend her 
in the process. He was not totally successful nor was he 
completely unsuccessful in influencing the Cabinet along 
these lines. In any event he did not oppose the measures
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ultimately adopted. As a moderate, he sought to bring the 
two extremes together through the give and take of negotia­
tion, thus his abortive efforts with Franklin and towards 
obtaining commissioners to treat with America. The extremes 
were farther apart than he thought: Franklin's unyielding
demands were as unacceptable as the unyielding force 
advocated by the Bedfords. As a pragmatist, he got each to 
make what concessions they would, and over-optimistically 
hoped for the beat. In the end, the constitutional diver­
gence was too great to be negotiated, and too great even to 
be suffered to continue in silence until time and progress 
could produce a peaceful solution.
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do give their reader an insight into what he knew, with 
the advantage of guessing what his reaction would he 
(although one can*t be certain he read all of them, at 
least he read most)* The main difficulty with this source, 
as noted above, is that letters from Dartmouth reflect the 
decisions of the cabinet and the phraseology of the under­
secretary, especially those dated at times he was usually 
in the country* Carter*e The Correspondence of General Gage, 
fits in this category, as does The Correspondence of Joseph 
Reed. The latter is distinguished, however, by the in­
clusion of a letter from Dartmouth to Reed which was almost 
certainly written by h|m since it is of a private nature-
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and was most useful in determining hit real feelings*
The second attempt to probe Dartmouth1® mind was through, 
a study of the Historical Manuscripts Commission calendar 
of the Earl*a paper®. Unfortunately, a calendar leaves 
much to be deaired since most of the letters are abstracted 
and described and those that are actual quotations from the 
original are cut and some of the context is missing-. How 
discouraging to read something likes "Tells of news from 
America and gives opinions on what should be done*" What 
newetl What opinions?* Nevertheless, there was some valua­
ble information here. A final regret is that Dartmouth 
must not have kept a letterbook for there were few of his 
personal letters.
The third approach, and in some ways the most fruitful, 
was to read what his contemporaries had to say about him* 
Hutchinson1# diary, Franklin’s letters, and the correspon­
dence of 0#orge III, were the most revealing as each had 
extensive contact with Dartmouth and frequently recorded 
their conversation© with him* Kn&x*n papers, calendared by 
the Historical Manuscripts Commission were also of some 
help* Obviously the defect with such sources is the preju* 
dice of the reporter; the point of view of each influenced 
the light in which they saw the American Secretary.
Since a trip to the William Salt Library and a perusal 
of what remains of Dartmouth’s papers was out of the
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question, and ©inoe my primary so ureas were not Ideal* I 
relied on several secondary worfc© whose authors had seen 
the Dartmouth manuscripts* In particular these were Bradley 
Bargar*© Lord Dartmouth and the American Revolution, Margaret 
Specter1© ffhe American Department of the British Government 
1766-178%» and Benjamin Babaree*© The. Bo a ton fee Party,
Although my conclusions on Dartmouth differ ©lightly from 
hie I am most heavily Indebted to Bargar, especially for 
confirmation of the suspicion that Dartmouth was not as pro- 
American a© the Americans thought, which became the feulwarh 
of my thesis.
Other secondary vorfc© influenced my understanding of 
Dartmouth*s milieu, especially Blchard Bree* Qeorge IXX and 
the BollticIans4 My own limited experience with primary 
material© verified the analyse© of the author© I used.
One final notes in view of the fact that I have quoted 
from so many different primary and manuscript sources, I 
have modernised all capitalisation and punctuation in order 
to aahe the thesis consistent. While this detracts con­
siderably from the color of elghteenth-eeatury language it 
unclutter© a twentieth-century essay,
BiB&xoaiyypM*
36AHCSCRXPT8 (Public Record Office Microfilm la the personal 
library of Ira Camber)
Colonial Office 5/396 South Carolina
c* 0« 5/1353 Virginia
c. 0* 5/1007 lew fork
c« 0. 5/1008 Hew fork
c. 0. 5/765 Maseachusetts, from Dartmouth
c. 0# 5/?69 Massachusetts, from the Covernor
c< 0. $/$k6 Hew Hampshire, from the Covernor
e* 0. 5/9**t Raw Hampshire, from Dartmouth
c. 0* 5/993 Hew Jersey
o. 0. $/2k2 circular Letters
c. 0. 5/318 North Carolina
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